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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 930640-CA 
JOE F. JIRON, ) Dist. Civil No. 921400242 
) Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(i) (1989 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The first issue to be addressed on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to 
warrant a conviction in this matter and accordingly, whether the trial court erred in denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which was made at the end of the State's case. 
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction, the standard 
of review is well settled: 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be 
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
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that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
State v. Dunn. 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100 (Utah 1993); State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson. 
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)); accord. State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah App. 
1990), cert denied 804 P.2d 443 (1985). 
Second, did the trial court error in denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial 
based upon the Defendant's regained memory. 
In reviewing a claim that the trial court erred in denying a Motion for a New Trial, the 
appellate court is to assume that the trial court exercised proper discretion unless the record 
shows the contrary. State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985); Logan City v. Carlsen. 799 
P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990);and, State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). 
Third, did the trial court error in failing to grant a new trial based upon prosecutorial 
misconduct. Rulings concerning whether prosecutorial conduct justifies a mistrial will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991); State 
v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); (citing State v. Hodges. 30 Utah 2d 367, 370, 517 
P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974)). 
Fourth, did the trial court error in instructing the jury in this matter. A trial court's error 
in giving an instruction to the jury present questions of law only, therefore the appellate court 
reviews the action under the correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the 
trial court's ruling. Carpet Barn v. Department of Transportation. 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App. 
1990); State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991). 
Fifth, did the trial court error in allowing the introduction of evidence relating to the 
victim's anal injuries. In reviewing the lower court's evidentiary ruling, the decision of the 
lower court will not be over-turned absent an abuse of discretion State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). 
Sixth, did the trial court error in admitting certain other evidence. Specifically, did the 
trial court error in admitting the a) love letter from Norman to the Victim, Shelly Jiron; b) DNA 
evidence; and, c) communications between the Defendant and his wife including the handwritten 
note. The test on appeal is the same as with the fifth issue. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutory provisions include relevant portions of the criminal homicide 
statutes, Utah Code Annotated 76-5-201 and 203 (1953 as Amended), 
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intention-
ally [and] knowingly . . .causes the death of another 
human being. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-201 (1)(1953 as Amended); 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree 
if the actor: 
(a) intentionally and knowingly causes 
the death of another. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203 (l)(a)(1953 as Amended). 
Additionally, the arson statute with which the Defendant was charged, provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of arson if under circumstances not 
amounting to aggravated arson, he by means of fire or 
explosives unlawfully and intentionally damages: 
. . .(b) the property of another. . . . 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953 as Amended). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, Joe F. Jiron, was charged with Criminal Homicide, a First Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-5-201 and 203 (1953 as Amended), in that the 
Defendant allegedly, on or about December 17, 1991, in Utah County, Utah did intentionally 
and knowingly cause the death of Shelly Ann Jiron. 
Secondly, the Defendant was charged with Arson, a Third Degree Felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953 as Amended), in that the Defendant allegedly, on or 
about December 17, 1991, in Utah County, Utah, did unlawfully and intentionally damage the 
property of another by means of fire which damage was in excess of $1,000.00. 
The Defendant was convicted by a jury of both crimes and sentenced by the trial judge. 
The Appellant appeals his conviction herein. 
PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE 
1. The Amended Information was filed in this matter on May 15, 1992 (R. 40). 
2. The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the victim's hand written journals on 
August 31, 1992 (R. 188-198). The Defendant, through counsel, filed a Motion in Limine to 
Suppress Evidence Concerning the Victim's anal injuries on August 3, 1992 (R. 61-66). A 
Motion in Limine to Suppress DNA-Profiling evidence was filed on August 3, 1992 (R. 67-72). 
The Motion in Limine to Suppress statements made to the Defendant's rescuers after the accident 
was filed on August 5, 1992 (R. 74-82). 
3. On August 31 and September 1, 1992, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
related to the motions filed by the Defendant (R. 160-163). The trial court took the matter 
under advisement and, on September 15, 1992, issued a written ruling denying only the Motion 
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to Suppress the DNA- Profiling Evidence and presumably taking the remainder of the issues 
under advisement (R. 155-158). 
4. Judge Christensen, the trial judge, denied, by written Ruling, the Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress his statements made to rescuers after the accident on September 28, 1992 (R. 338). 
5. Judge Christensen denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress relating to the victim's 
anal injuries by written Ruling dated September 28, 1992 (R. 344). 
6. Judge Christensen partially denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress hand written 
notes and evidence in violation of the marital privilege by written Rulings on September 28 and 
30, 1992 (R. 353, 388-89). 
7. The case came on for trial on September 28, 29, 30, October 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7, 1992 
(R. 504-520). 
8. The Jury returned a verdict on October 7, 1992 finding the Defendant guilty on both 
charges (R. 503). 
9. The court set the time for pronouncement on Judgement and Sentence for November 
20, 1992. At that time the Defendant was sentenced on Count 1, Criminal Homicide, a First 
Degree Felony, to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than five years and 
maybe for life. On Count 2, Arson, a Third Degree Felony, the court sentenced the Defendant 
in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not more than five years. The prison 
sentences on Counts 1 and 2 were to run concurrently (R. 568-69). 
10. The Defendant, through counsel, served and filed a Motion For a New Trial on 
November 30, 1992 (R. 574-75). 
11. The court conducted oral arguments on the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial on 
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April 28, 1993 (R. 652-53). After receiving additional documents and memoranda, the court 
entered its ruling on June 16, 1993, denying the motion (R. 680-81). 
12. The Notice of Appeal was filed with the trial court on July 13, 1993 (R. 684-85). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Testimony of the First Person at the Scene. 
1. Mr. Fred C. Jensen testified that he worked at Ridgepoint Sand and Gravel, just north 
of Lehi, Utah County, Utah (Tr. 67, Lines 1-11). Mr. Jensen had both experience and training 
in emergency procedures and at one time was certified. Additionally, Mr. Jensen had 
experience in observing and handling bodies of deceased individuals (Tr. 84, Lines 1 through 
11; Tr. 89, Lines 4 though 10). As Mr. Jensen was travelling home from work on December 
17, 1991 at approximately 5:00 p.m., he travelled past the area that has been identified as the 
resting spot of the vehicle containing the Defendant and victim and noticed nothing unusual (Tr. 
69, Line 9 through 70, Line 2). As he traveled past the same spot that same night at 
approximately 7:00 p.m., he noticed a light off the side of the road (State Road No. 68) (Tr. 
70, lines 2 to 24). 
2. Thinking that someone was stranded off the side of the road, Mr. Jensen investigated. 
The weather was clear and there was snow on the ground, which was basically frozen. The 
temperature was approximately seventeen degrees. Mr. Jensen turned his vehicle to facilitate 
the shining of his headlights on the area in question. After identifying the object as a vehicle, 
Mr. Jensen climbed the fence alongside the road and approached the vehicle (Tr. 71, line 1 
through 73, line 23; Tr. 89, Lines 1 through 3). 
3. Mr. Jensen observed that the inside of the car windows were fogged. He opened the 
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driver's door and observed Mr. Jiron, the Defendant on the driver's seat. Mr. Jensen testified 
that it was warm inside the vehicle. With a flashlight, Mr. Jensen saw that there was another 
person in the front passenger seat. Not being able to get a response from Mr. Jiron, Mr. Jensen 
went back to his car to retrieve blankets and have his wife go for help (Tr. 74, Lines 1 to 7; 
Tr 88, Line, 19 through 24). 
4. Returning to the vehicle, Mr. Jensen noticed a strong odor of gas. Opening the 
passenger door, Mr. Jensen observed the victim down off the seat, covered with a small blanket, 
facing the door, with her head and shoulders on the seat (Tr. 74, Lines 8 to 22; Tr. 80, Lines 
10 through 19). The victim's mouth was partially opened about one-half inch (Tr. 81, Lines 11 
though 25). Mr Jensen did not notice that the victim had no clothing on her, with the exception 
of the blanket, until she was placed on a stretcher by the paramedics (Tr. 80 lines 20 through 
24). Mr. Jensen observed a gas can under the victim's feet between the fire wall and the door, 
in an upright position. Noting that the gas can did not have a lid, Mr. Jensen took the can and 
threw it out of the vehicle (Tr. 74, Line 23 to 75, Line 25; Tr. 86, Line 24 to 87, Line 5). 
5. Within five minutes of returning to the vehicle, Mr. Jensen attempted to determine 
the condition of the female passenger and testified that he got a pulse on her neck for a few 
seconds (Tr. 76, Line 14 to 77, Line 8; Tr. 78, Lines 7 to 13). When he checked for a pulse 
four or five minutes later, he was unable to detect any pulse (Tr. 85, Lines 7 through 25). Mr. 
Jensen described the victim as not having any physical damage and as being limp. Specifically, 
Mr. Jensen could not detect any rigor mortis when moving her arms and testified that her body 
was warm (Tr. 82, lines 1 to 83, Line 18). Additionally, Mr. Jensen kept trying to get a 
response from Mr. Jiron, who was not completely unconscious but appeared to be "out of it" 
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(Tr. 77, Lines 13 to 16). Feeling that it was inappropriate to remove either of the individuals 
from the car, he did not render mouth to mouth resuscitation or any other first aid. Mr. Jensen 
waited forty-five minutes to an hour for help to arrive (Tr. 77, line 23 to 78, Line 6). 
B. Testimony Relating to the Investigation at the Scene. 
6. Sergeant Jens Horn testified that he was a Patrol Supervisor for the Utah County 
Sheriff. At approximately 7:15 p.m., he was dispatched to the scene and arrived at 
approximately 7:30 p.m. (Tr. 92, Lines 7 to 19; Tr. 93, Lines 19 to 22; Tr. 104, Lines 11 to 
17). The officer noticed the subject vehicle straddling a gully and proceeded to the cut the fence 
along the road to allow access for the paramedics, who arrived a minute later (Tr. 95; Lines 
11 to 22; Tr. 96, Lines 1 to 7). 
7. In examining the area, Sergeant Horn noticed that the approximately 20 feet of fence 
along the road and a fence running perpendicular to the road, stretching to the lake, had been 
damaged. The officer testified that the vehicle apparently had left the road and travelled 
approximately 750 feet without significant braking (Tr. 106, Lines 10 to 20; Tr. 99, line 18 to 
101, line 21; Tr. 109, lines 13 to 25). The officer was able to trace the path of the vehicle by 
the marks in the snow from the roadway to the final resting spot at the gully, with the exception 
of areas where the vehicle had become airborne (Tr. 110, Lines 8 to 20). The officer testified 
that it was his opinion that the vehicle was travelling 35 to 40 m.p.h. when it contacted the 
gully, where it came to rest (Tr. 110, Line 25 to 111, Line 19). 
8. Officer Les Langford, a sergeant with the Utah Highway Patrol testified, testified that 
he was dispatched to the area and observed the vehicle at the end of an approximately 750 foot 
track from the roadway (Tr. 117, Lines 10 to 25). The Officer observed several items in the 
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car including a book of matches that had been ignited and three separate matches on the front 
seat, two of which had the heads burned. Additionally, the officer noticed a ladies' handbag in 
the back seat (Tr. 120, Line 17 to 121, Line 4; Tr. 125, Lines 7 to 15). The Officer noted 
damage to the windshield on the driver's side consistent with a head striking the windshield on 
the driver's side (the officer noted hair and blood on the windshield) (Tr. 122, Lines 4 to 8; Tr. 
123, Lines 2 to 11). The Officer testified that he believed that there had been a fire inside the 
vehicle and that the windows on the inside of the vehicle had a black soot on them. The 
headliner, visor and steering wheel had been burned. Nothing in the lower portion of the 
vehicle had been burned. The Officer could not tell if the impact on the windshield on the 
driver's side had occurred before or after the soot had developed on the window (Tr. 122, Lines 
16 to 123, Line 11). Finally the Officer testified that there was a strong odor of gasoline in the 
car and that both portions of the separated front seats in the vehicle appeared to be saturated 
with gas (Tr. 124, Lines 18 to 24; Tr. 133, Lines 1 to 12). The parties stipulated that the 
temperature on December 17, 1991 was a high of 39 degrees and a low of 14 degrees (Tr. 
1261, Lines 16 to 23). 
9. Officer Langford testified that his opinion from an examination of the car, was that 
the speed on impact was approximately 20 miles per hour (Tr. 128, Line 1 to 129, Line 7). 
10. Officers Turner and Whitney, patrolmen with the Utah Highway Patrol testified that 
there were dispatched to the scene and arrived at approximately 7:50 p.m. (Tr. 155, lines 15 to 
20; Tr. 170, Lines 3 and 4). Officer Turner helped in removing the Defendant from the vehicle. 
The Defendant initially appeared to be unconscious and then after being placed on the backboard 
started to regain consciousness. The Defendant started to speak but was not very understandable 
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due to his injuries consisting of burned arms, massive trauma to his face, and one eye swollen 
shut (Tr. 139, Lines 10 to 25; Tr. 162, Lines 7 to 22). After placing the Defendant in the 
ambulance, the Defendant became combative, wanted to be left alone and had to be physically 
restrained (Tr. 140, Lines 12 to 25; Tr. 141, Lines 3 to 11). 
11. In their investigation later that night, Officer Whitney observed an envelope and 
letter that had been in the handbag located in the car (Tr. 173, Line 20 to 174, Line 23). The 
Officers noticed the odor of gasoline in the vehicle and observed the soot on the inside of the 
car's windows and the heavy fire damage to the car from the dash area up (Tr. 142, Line 13; 
Tr. 144, Lines 12 to 21; Tr. 175, Lines 2 to 5; Tr. 178, Lines 18 to 22). The Officers also 
noticed the damage to the inside of the car window on the driver's side and the damage to the 
exterior of the windshield apparently caused by objects striking it (Tr. 144, Line 22 to 145, Line 
20; Tr. 177, Lines 14 to 21). Officer Whitney also noticed the matches on the floor and the seat 
of the car (Tr. 178, Lines 2 to 6). Additionally, there were female clothes and shoes in the back 
seat of the car that had gasoline on them. Gasoline was noted all over both front seats and the 
back of the car (Tr. 182, Line 22 to 185, Line 4; Tr. 189, Line 25 to 191, Line 7). 
12. Officers Turner and Whitney determined the distance travelled by the vehicle from 
the roadway to it's point of rest at the gully to be 739 feet (Tr. 146, Lines 14 to 24). The 
Officers did not observe any signs of skidding or heavy braking and were able to follow the 
tracks in a continuous line except for areas where the tires had left the ground (Tr. 146, Line 
25 to 148, Line 7). The patrolmen described the terrain as small "rabbit type brush" standing 
eighteen to twenty-four inches high (Tr. 148, Lines 8 to 22). The Officers testified that fifty feet 
of fence comprising several posts on the fence closest to the roadway were sheared off and wires 
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were broken and other fence lines damaged or broken (Tr. 150, Line 13 to 151, Line 18; Tr. 
157, Line 18 to 158, Line 2). Officer Turner estimated the speed on impact to be thirty to forty 
miles per hour (Tr. 156, Line 24 to 157, Line 8). Mr. Thomas Proctor, an accident 
reconstructionist, testified that the speed of the vehicle was approximately forty mile per hour 
at impact (Tr. 1339, Line 10 to 1340, Line 21). 
C. Testimony of Paramedics and Emergency Medical Personnel. 
13. The emergency paramedics and associated personnel that were involved at the scene 
were called as witnesses. Because their testimony did not conflict significantly, it is not 
separated. Three individuals comprised the ambulance team responding from Lehi on December 
17, 1991 Tr. 198, Lines 2 to 25). When the paramedics arrived, a check was made of the 
Defendant who was unresponsive, but the paramedic could hear breathing and had a bystander 
support the head to keep the airway open (Tr. 205, Line 18 to 205, Line 1). Attempts to locate 
a pulse on the victim met with no success (Tr. 199, Lines 9 to 14; Tr. 22, Line 17 to 201, Line 
1). 
14. The victim was down on the floor in the fetal position and her head was on the seat. 
The victim was wearing no clothes (Tr. 201, Lines 1 to 24). The victim's body at the time the 
paramedics arrived was clammy and there was a smell of burned skin and hair (Tr. 203, Lines 
1 to 11). The paramedic described the body as "clayey" in response to a query of the presence 
of rigor mortis. The paramedic thought the victim had been dead for some time but had no idea 
as to the length of time (Tr. 204, Lines 6 to 22; Tr. 276, Lines 17 to 25). The paramedic could 
not determine any injuries other than burned hair and chemical burns on her back and neck (Tr. 
245, Lines 10 to 19; Tr. 285, Lines 15 to 22). 
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15. When the Defendant was transported to the ambulance, the paramedics noticed that 
he was fully clothed (Tr. 207, Lines 2 to 13). As the Defendant gained consciousness in the 
ambulance, he asked to be left alone and was combative, wanted to be left alone and had to be 
physically restrained. The paramedics testified that such an attitude is not at all unusual with 
trauma patients (Tr. 207, Line 20 to 208, Line 12; Tr. 218, Lines 10 to 13; Tr. 219, Line 19 
to 220, Line 15; Tr. 279, Lines 16 to 24). The paramedics observed that the Defendant's shirt, 
hair and arms were burned (Tr. 208, Lines 19 to 25). In addition, the Defendant had burns to 
his genitals, chemical burns between his legs and a deep cut above his left eye (Tr. 210, Lines 
4 to 13; Tr. 213, Lines 19 to 25). The paramedic noted that the Defendant's face and hair was 
burned, but the laceration on his head, was not (Tr. 213, Lines 19 to 25). 
16. Mr. Brian Day Andreason testified that he was the investigator that was on-call for 
Utah County from the State Medical Examiner's Office. He examined the victim's body at the 
American Fork Hospital on the night of the incident (Tr. 288, Line 15 to 289, Line 8). Mr. 
Andreason had two nurses in the Emergency Room obtain a core temperature in order to derive 
the inner temperature of the body to aid in the ascertainment of the time of death (Tr. 291, Lines 
2 to 22). The temperature was taken at 10:05 p.m. on the night of the incident by using a probe 
through the rectum (Tr. 291, Line 23 to 292, Line 5). The ambient temperature was 71 degrees 
(room temperature), and the temperature of the body was 85.7 degrees (Tr. 292, Lines 15 to 
19). 
17. Mr. Andreason, in examining the body noted that the victim's hair was singed. The 
vessels under the eyelids were red. There was soot on the victim's hands and some skin 
slippage about her feet. The victim's back appeared to be burned and had attached to it a black 
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plastic substance (Tr.293, Line 23 to 294, Line 7). Mr. Andreason noted only slight rigor 
mortis and lividity which was consistent with lying the victim on her back in the hospital (Tr. 
295, Lines 2 to 9). 
D. Background Evidence and Testimony Relating to the 
Events of December 12 to December 15, 1991. 
18. Dusty Jiron, age 19, the Defendant's brother, testified that his brother was five years 
older than him. Dusty testified that the victim, Shelly Jiron or Shelly Conk, was Joe Jiron's first 
wife (Tr. 309, Line 18 to 310, Line 10). Dusty testified that Joe was married a second time to 
Dawn after the Defendant was divorced from Shelly (Tr. 311, Lines 2 to 11). It was stipulated 
by counsel at trial that the Defendant and the victim, Shelly Conk, were divorced because of an 
allegation of infidelity on the part of Shelly (Tr. 322, Lines 2 to 7). 
19. Dusty Jiron testified that he was married in Logan, Utah, on December 14, 1991, 
three days before the incident in question (Tr. 322, Lines 13 to 22). On December 13, 1991, 
Dusty talked with the Defendant who was residing with his wife, Dawn, in Salt Lake. Dusty 
testified that Joe sounded ill and under the weather (Tr. 323, Line 8 to 324, Line 16). Dusty 
said that the Defendant attended his wedding and appeared to have the flu (Tr. 325, Lines 3 to 
25). Otherwise, Dusty testified that the Defendant had a good time and was in good spirits (Tr. 
326, Lines 2 to 12). 
20. Dawn Antonsen, the Defendant's second wife testified that she married the 
Defendant on September 14, 1990 and was divorced from the Defendant on May 8, 1992 
(Tr.327, Line 19 to 328, Line 19). Dawn had one child prior to marriage (Brittney, age three) 
and Dawn and the Defendant had one child together (Justin, age one) (Tr. 362, Line 17 to 363, 
13 
Line 5). Dawn testified that she and the Defendant were separated from January, 1991 to 
August, 1991 (Tr. 334, Line 19 to 335, Line 2). Dawn admitted on cross-examination that there 
had been major problems during the course of the marriage and in fact the couple had lived apart 
for most of the marriage (Tr. 362, Lines 1 to 15). Dawn testified that in December of 1991, 
the Defendant was living with her, that their marital problems continued and that they had 
financial problems of some significance (Tr. 335, Lines 17 to 25). 
21. Dawn testified that on December 12, 1991, the Defendant had an appointment with 
a dentist. Because the dentist required a payment of $200.00 to initiate care of the Defendant, 
Dawn cancelled the appointment (Tr. 336, Line 1 to 337, Line 2). The Defendant came home 
at 10:00 a.m. that day and asked Dawn to try and find another dentist that day that did not 
require payment and Dawn was unsuccessful. Accordingly, the Defendant ordered pizza and 
left the house (Tr.337, Lines 3 to 18). The Defendant went to Dan's Food's located on 4700 
South and 2600 West, at approximately 11:50 a.m. and purchased grape juice and another item 
that may have been over an over-the-counter sleeping pills, Sleepinal, but the cash register 
receipt could not establish the purchase of the pills (Tr. 419, Line 4 to 425, Line 25; Tr. 429, 
Line 11 to 438, Line 25). The Defendant returned forty-five minutes later with scotch and juice 
and started to eat the pizza and poured a drink (Dawn testified that the Defendant is not a 
drinker, and that he drank only on occasion)(Tr. 337, Line 19 to 338, Line 22). Dawn testified 
that the Defendant basically watched T.V. and took a bath that night (Tr. 339, Lines 2 to 7). 
Dawn left to go to a church meeting at approximately 6:45 p.m. and when she returned at 10:00 
p.m. that evening, Joe was coming out of the bathroom-having just thrown up. Dawn cleaned 
the bed up, made the Defendant a bed on the couch and the parties retired. Joe slept most of 
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the day, December 13, 1991 (Tr. 339, Line 16 to 341, Line 13). Dawn had called the 
Defendant's work reporting that Joe was sick (Tr. 392, Line 24 to 393, Line 4). Dawn testified 
that they received a letter from the Office of Recovery Services on Friday, December 13, 1991, 
requesting repayment of approximately $580.00 for aid when the parties were living together. 
Dawn showed the letter to the Defendant, who had no reaction to the letter (Tr. 341, Line 21 
to 342, Line 17). 
22. Dawn testified that the Defendant had a yellow Mercury Marquis automobile with 
all kinds of problems including the brakes and alternator (Tr. 342, Lines 18 to 343, Line 5; Tr. 
371, Line 12 to 372, Line 1). Dawn and her father both identified a gas can that had been 
purchased by her father when she ran out of gas that fall, which can was found at the scene of 
the accident (Tr. 343, Line 17 to 345, Line 1; Tr. 374, Line 24 to 376, Line 6). 
23. Dawn testified that the Defendant was a very nice person, pleasant to be around but 
that he had a temper that could develop quickly (Tr. 345, Lines 1 to 17). Steve Hansen, the 
Defendant's employer also testified that the Defendant was very easy to get along with (Tr. 390, 
Lines 22 to 25). 
24. On December 14, 1991, the Defendant got ready to go to his brother's wedding and 
Dawn went to her mother's house with her children (Tr. 345, Line 18 to 346, Line 4). Persons 
attending the wedding reported that the Defendant was happy, enjoyed himself and was not 
depressed about any incident or recent happening (Tr. 1256, Line 3 to 1260, Line 14). Dawn 
testified that she did not see the Defendant again until the afternoon of Sunday, December 15, 
1991 (Tr. 346, Lines 5 to 11). When the Defendant returned, the family took a nap together, 
ate dinner, watched T.V. and went to bed (Tr. 346, Line 12 to 347, Line 4). 
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E. Events of December 16, 1991. 
25. Steve Hansen testified that he was the owner of Hansen Dry wall Company and that 
the Defendant was employed by him from April 16, 1991 to December of 1991 and that the 
Defendant was an excellent worker. The Defendant was employed in construction as a dry waller 
(Tr. 347 Lines 5 to 16; Tr. 388, Line 6 to 389, Line 25). Dawn testified that the Defendant got 
up to go to work at approximately 7:00 a.m., his usual time. Steve Hansen, the Defendant's 
employer testified that he talked to the Defendant that morning and the defendant was in good 
spirits and happy (Tr. 395, Line 16 to 396, Line 4). The Defendant, after leaving for work, 
returned home about forty-five minutes to an hour later because he had forgotten his electrical 
cord. In the process of retrieving the cord, the Defendant and his wife, Dawn started talking. 
The Defendant decided that he was no going to go back to work (Tr. 393, Line 7 to 394, Line 
4). Dawn, at the Defendant's request, obtained a piece of paper and pencil for the Defendant 
(Tr. 348, Line 9 to 349, Line 18). 
26. Dawn testified that at the Defendant's request, she wrote certain matters on a piece 
of paper. Specifically, she wrote that she was to pick up the Defendant's paychecks and pay the 
Defendant's mother $200.00. Dawn was to give Dusty $200.00 and tell a co-worker, Steve, that 
his tools were at the house and that he could have the Defendant's screw gun. Finally, the 
stealth gun and lights were to be given to Steve (Tr. 350, Lines 1 to 8). 
27. Dawn testified that the Defendant then told her that she could have the house and 
all of the possessions and in response to Dawn's comment that the house was not in her name, 
the Defendant wrote on the note a clause giving Dawn all of his possessions and the home (Tr. 
350, Line 11 to 351, Line 2). 
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28. Dawn testified that the Defendant did not talk about a divorce but only that he was 
tired of life and wanted to quit (Tr 351, Lines 5 to 25). On cross-examination, Dawn admitted 
that the couple had serious problems in their relationship including the fact that they did not have 
sex (Tr. 363, Line 12 to 367, Line 11). Dawn testified that the Defendant then emptied the car, 
including the trunk and left (Tr. 352, Lines 1 to 353, Line 2). Joe returned to get a key to the 
gas tank lid and told Dawn that he did not want her to call church officials for help (Tr. 353, 
Line 3 to 354, Line 6). 
29. Dawn testified that she called several people, including the Defendant's employer, 
because she thought that the Defendant was going to commit suicide (Tr. 354, Line 7 to 355, 
Line 5; Tr. 394, Lines 5 to 14). On cross-examination, Dawn testified that after the Defendant 
left, she thought Joe was just going to blow off steam and would be back in a couple of days 
(Tr. 368, Lines 2 to 13). Corporal Les Newren, from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Department testified that Dawn Jiron, the Defendant's wife called on December 16, 1991 at 9:31 
p.m. indicating that her husband was missing and wanting to file a missing persons report. She 
indicated to the corporal that he did not have a weapon but had taken some sleeping pills with 
him (Tr. 382, Line 22 to 387, Line 2). 
30. Dawn testified that in a conversation that occurred after the incident, the Defendant 
stated that he left because there was not enough sex in the marriage (Tr. 360, Lines 2 to 18). 
31. The Defendant's vehicle was found abandoned by Park Ro She, an amusement park 
located at 820 North Main in Springville, Utah County, Utah, on December 18, 1991 (Tr. 399, 
Lines 11 to 24; Tr. 409, Line 24 to 414, Line 12). The car was parked in the vicinity of a pay 
phone and, when the car was searched, Exhibit 54, a receipt as well as a sack from Dan's 
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grocery (Exhibit 55) and two boxes of sleeping pills (sleepinal) were found. Additionally the 
gas cap from that car (Exhibit 57) and the gas cap key were located underneath the driver's side 
seat. Additionally, there was a gas can, Exhibit 56 (which was the same type of can identified 
by Dawn and her father as being purchased to get gas for the car in the fall of 1991), in the 
trunk, which was two-thirds full. The car had three-eights of a tank of gas and was operable for 
the sheriffs department when it was driven to the impound lot (Tr. 399, Line 4 to 403, Line 
5; Tr. 408, Line 21 to 417, Line 13). 
32. After the car was released from impound, Dawn told the Defendant's employer 
however, that she needed money to get the car repaired because it was not running (Tr. 396, 
Line 19 to 397, Line 10). 
33. Testimony was given concerning phone calls from the pay phone located near Park 
Ro She, where the Defendant's car was found on December 16, 1991. The call was placed from 
489-9986 to 375-2179 (the residence of Ross L. Conk, 1387 West 570 North, #6) at 10:34 a.m. 
and lasted just over two minutes (Tr. 445, Line 20 to 447, Line 20; Tr. 449, Line 16 to 450, 
Line 6). Ross Conk, the victim's father testified that Shelly Conk, the victim, was living with 
him on December 16, 1991 and that the car involved in the accident was registered to him but 
that Shelly was making the payments (Tr. 479, Line 8 to 482, Line 22). 
34. An Employee from First Security Bank testified that there is a bank branch at 119 
South Main, in Springville, that is just south of Park Ro She. Exhibit 79, a countercheck in the 
amount of $80.00 was negotiated by the Defendant Joe Jiron on December 16, 1991 at 10:42 
a.m.(Tr. 466, Line 19 to 472, Line 10; Exhibits 17 and 79). 
35. An employee of K-Mart in Spanish Fork testified that the gas can, Exhibit 19 (the 
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can found in the car at the scene of the accident) was purchased at that store on December 16, 
1991 at 11:26 a.m. (Exhibits 19 and 50; Tr. 453, Line 17 to 457, Line 20; Tr. 459, Line 13 to 
462, Line 12). 
36. An Employee of First Security Bank located on 95 North Main in Pay son, Utah, 
testified that another countercheck, signed by the Defendant on his account, Exhibit 78, in the 
amount of $40.00 was negotiated on December 16, 1991 at 1:24 p.m. (Tr. 473, Line 15 to 477, 
Line 10). 
37. The victim's mother, Mrs. Carma Carver, testified that Shelly had a male friend 
named Norman who Shelly had been seeing. The mother testified that she had been baby sitting 
Shelly's two children from Thursday, December 12 until Monday December 16, 1991. During 
that time Norman came to her house looking for Shelly who was not present. Norman composed 
a letter to Shelly, Exhibit 23, and asked Mrs. Carver to deliver it to Shelly with two red roses 
(Tr. 486, Line 17 to 492, Line 16). The letter, in substance stated that Norman was sorry to 
miss have missed Shelly; that Shelly was in love with the greatest [Norman]; that plans were 
made to meet Shelly the next Thursday unless she wanted to contact him earlier; and, expressed 
his love for her and recited that Shelly had expressed her love to him (Tr. 629, Line 24 to 630, 
Line 24; Exhibit 23). The letter was found still in the envelope at the scene of the accident with 
no evidence by way of fingerprints that it was handled by the Defendant (Tr. 667, Line 19 to 
668, Line 13). 
38. Shelly dropped by her mother's trailer home located at 295 North 1200 West in 
Orem, on Sunday, December 15, 1991 and asked her mother to keep the children a while longer 
(Tr. 492, Line 20 to 493, Line 3). Shelly then attended a party with Abelina Hunick, the 
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Defendant's sister, at Sundance ski resort for several hours on Sunday night and then went to 
Salt Lake for a couple of hours returning to her father's house that night (Tr. 533, Line 2 to 
534, Line 6). Shelly returned with the Defendant in Shelly's car on Monday, December 16, 
1991 between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. (Tr. 493, Line 4 to 494, Line 21). Shelly told her mother and 
Charles Quillin that Joe was having problems with his car and that she had gone to get him and 
get gas (Tr. 496, Lines 19 to 23; Tr. 507, Lines 20 to 23). Shelly told her mother's room mate, 
Charles Quillin, during the visit, that the Joe was having some personal problems and wanted 
her to help him work them out (Tr. 507, Lines 3 to 23) Shelly took Exhibit 22, that had the 
kid's clothes, the kids and presumably the letter and roses and left (Tr. 496, Line 24 to 498, 
Line 13). 
39. Testimony was given that phone calls from a pay phone located at 300 South Main 
in Spanish Fork at a 7-11 store were made on the 16th of December, 1991 (Tr. 440, Line 3 to 
443, Line 7). The first call was to phone number 768-8281 (the subscriber was Matthew 
Hunick, residing at 9322 West 9600 North, Lehi) and was placed at 3:24 p.m. and lasted over 
three minutes. (Tr. 447, Line 21 to 449, Line 15). Abelina Hunick, the Defendant's sister, said 
that Shelly, the victim, had called her enthusiastically saying that she had a date with some 
mexican and asked if Abelina would watch the kids. (Tr. 542, Lines 6 to 20). When she arrived 
at Abelina's house, she was with the Defendant and explained that Joe had experienced car 
problems (Tr. 536, Line 2 to 537, Line 15). The record established that the Defendant and 
Shelly had continued to see each other after their divorce and calls to each other or visits were 
not uncommon (Tr. 549, Lines 20 to 25). Abelina testified that Shelly had told her that they 
were going to go "talk and confuse people" (Tr. 537, Lines 6 to 22). Both the Defendant and 
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Shelly were reportedly happy, joking and having a good time (Tr. 542, Line 21 to 543, Line 
23). Abelina testified that Shelly smoked and most often used book matches to light them (Tr. 
546, Line 1 to 23). 
40. The second call was to phone number 798-7285, placed at 5:24 p.m. and lasted 
nearly 2 minutes. Both were collect calls (Tr.443, Line 22 to 445, Line 7). 
F. Events of December 17, 1991 to the Time of the Accident, 
41. Mrs. Geraldine Quigley, a manager of the Super 8 Motel in Wendover, Nevada and 
other employees testified that Joe Jiron registered two people at the hotel on December 16, 1991, 
sometime after 3:00 p.m. He was assigned room 106. The room was paid for in cash. The 
Defendant and Shelly Jiron had vacated the room by approximately 11:00 a.m. on the 17th and 
left the keys in the room (Tr. 555, Line 25 to 577, Line 5; Tr. 687, Line 5 to 692, Line 5, 
Exhibit 53). 
42. Shelly called Abelina Hunick collect from Wendover at 10:11 a.m.. In that 
conversation, Shelly asked if Abelina could watch the kids a little longer. Shelly indicated that 
she and Joe were getting ready to take a shower and then go to breakfast. Shelly was happy and 
indicated they were having a good time (Tr. 539, Line 8 to 541, Line 1; Exhibit 52; Tr. 450, 
Lines 1 to 20; Tr. 547, Lines 2 to 25). 
43. On December 27, 1991, the law enforcement personnel involved in the case located 
another area thought to be involved in the factual scenario. The second location was nine-tenths 
of a mile back on State Road 68, to Soldier's Pass Road and then 1.3 miles up the road (Tr. 
650, Lines 4 to 18; Exhibit 2). The officers found a box of cigarettes, a pair of ladies's panties, 
a wad of toilet paper and a "gob" of toilet paper, a Salt Lake County Inspection slip in the name 
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of Ross Conk (Tr. 652, Line 12 to 656, Line 18; Exhibits 10, 37, 38, 11, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 
44 and 45). No evidence was found indicating that any violence took place at that scene. No 
blood or weapons were found (Tr. 675, Lines 14 to 23). There was no way to establish when 
or how the items got to that location or who put them there (Tr. 678, Line 24 to 680, Line 15). 
44. Testimony was introduced that the cigarette cellophane packaging found at the 
second crime scene matched the packaging found at the first accident scene (Tr. 989, Line 12 
to 990, Line 16, Exhibits 44 and 35). No match of the toilet paper portions and rolls could be 
made other than they were similar (Tr. 990, Line 17 to 991, Line 22, Exhibits 30 and 38). the 
victim's thumb print was found on the package of cigarettes found at the second location 
(Tr.995, Line 5 to 996, Line 22, Exhibit 39). No fingerprints could be located on Exhibit 23, 
the letter from Norman (Tr. 996, Line 22 to 998, Line 14). In fact, it was established that the 
Defendant did not handle the letter (Exhibit 23; Tr. 1000, Lines 4 to 24). 
G. Medical Testimony Relating to the Victim and Defendant 
45. Numerous references were made to an anal tear discovered on the victim's body 
during the autopsy (Tr. 589, Line 16 to 591, Line 3; Exhibit 12; Tr. 599, Line 11 to 601, Line 
5). Dr. William M. Palmer testified that the lacerations extended only down into the 
subcutaneous tissue. The doctor testified that the lacerations would have been painful but would 
not be the result of anal intercourse (either consensual or forced), because of their location in 
an area other than the skin area and mucous membrane of the anus. The doctor testified that 
they were created by some kind of sharp object. The doctor testified that the lacerations could 
not have been caused by a stretching or a blunt object being applied with force (Tr. 1004, Line 
5 to 1010, Line 12; Tr. 1017, Lines 2 to 4). The doctor testified that the wounds could have 
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been caused when a person was thrown against something that had a sharp object; could have 
been accidentally inflicted or the result of a fall (Tr. 1017, Line 15 to 1018, Line 6). 
46. The Utah State Crime Lab determined both the Defendant and the Victim, Shelly 
Jiron to have "A" blood type and also determined the presence of sperm in both Shelly's vagina 
and anus (Tr. 777, Lines 10 to 15; Tr. 778, Lines 3 to 18: Tr. 781, Lines 17 to 23; Tr. 782, 
Line 19 to 25). Dr. Henry testified that the deposit of the sperm was relatively recent (Tr. 801, 
Lines 7 to 23; Tr. 816, Line 14 to 817, Line 22). 
47. The panties found at the second crime scene were found positive for seminal fluid 
and the cigarette butts at that location were antigen positive, consistent with type "A" blood, 
which comprises 40% of the population (Tr. 802, Line 11 to 807, Line 25; Tr. 821, Lines 4 to 
8). 
48. Extensive DNA profiling of the sperm samples, established that it was highly 
unlikely that any individual other than the Defendant could have been the donor (Tr. 928, Line 
13 to 929, Line 2; Tr. 963, Line 20 to 964, Line 8). 
49. Medical testimony was introduced that even if a person ingested all of the sleeping 
pills (Exhibit 55) purchased in this case and consumed with alcohol, it would only cause extreme 
drowsiness and sleep and maybe coma (Tr. 1010, Line 23 to 1012, Line 11). 
50. Dr. Leis testified that he performed an autopsy on the Victim, Shelly Jiron, on 
December 18, 1991 (Tr. 1100, Line 25 to 1102, Line 14). The relevant findings at the autopsy 
are as follows: 
A. Minor singeing of the scalp hair toward the front (Tr. 1104, Line 12 to 17) 
and singing of the hair along the entire length along the backside, most significant on the back 
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side of the head, was found (Tr. 1106, Lines 2 to 5). 
B. The doctor noted congestion or lividity on her right cheek and jaw (Tr. 1104, 
Lines 17 to 20) and a small bruise (3/8 of an inch) on the left cheek (Tr. 1105, Lines 3 to 6). 
C. Petechiae or small hemorrhages were found in her eyes (Tr. 1104, Lines 21 
to 23). Usually petechiae are present when there is a low oxygen supply to the area causing the 
vessels to become weak and fragile and then any increase in blood pressure causes hemorrhage 
(Tr.1105, Line 2 to 18). Petechiae are consistent with an asphyxial type of event (Tr. 1115, 
Lines 19 to 25). No bruises to the neck or back or other evidence of strangulation were found 
(Tr. 1116, Lines 19 to 25). Dr. Gruwell noted that the quantity of hemorrhage was mild and that 
they could be caused by choking or any serious attempt to obtain oxygen (Tr.1282, Line 19 to 
1288, Line 1). 
D. Soot was found underneath the victim's nose (Tr. 1104, Line 24 to 1105, Line 
2), and on the back of her fingers (Tr. 1162, Line 8 to 1163, Line 15). 
E. Skin slippage due to heat or gasoline was found beneath her right armpit, left 
thigh, upper back, buttocks and ankle (Tr. 1105, Lines 7 to 25, Tr. 1106, Lines 5 to 21). The 
burns or slippage were not life threatening (Tr. 1107, Lines 1 to 10). Microscopic examination 
revealed no response by the body such as bleeding, inflammation or the like to the injury site 
consistent with the injuries occurring after death (Tr. 1107, Line 11 to 1108, Line 25). A 
elliptical piece was skin found in the vehicle underneath the dash which matched an area on her 
left buttocks. The doctor surmised that the skin was loosened by the application of gasoline after 
death and then a loosening of the skin that would cause it to come off at the time of impact (Tr. 
1109, Line 12 to 1110, Line 20). The doctor admitted that it was very hard for him to determine 
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if the gasoline came into contact with the body before, at or after the time of death (Tr. 1160 
Lines 20 to 24). Dr. Gruwell disagreed. He testified that the skin found on the dashboard was 
consistent with a person getting burned, and falling against the dashboard (Tr.1293, Lines 13 
to 24). Dr. Gruwell testified that the skin slippage could be characterized as blistering. The 
doctor testified that there were a combination of blisters that were still intact and some that were 
denuded (blisters that had formed and ruptured with a well vascularized base underneath the 
blister). The doctor testified that the blistering process that was well in place on Shelly's body 
requires metabolic energy to occur in that it is an active body function (Tr. 1288, Line 2 to 
1292, Line 7). Dr. Gruwell testified that Shell Jiron had to be alive when the thermal injury 
occurred because of the presence of a blister and evidence of very active vascularization or 
reddening at the site of the blister evidencing the body's attempt to provide blood and nutrients 
to the area (Tr. 1292, Lines 8 to 24). In rebuttal testimony, Doctor Leis disagreed and testified 
that blisters could form in dead bodies but did admit that the blisters could have occurred before 
or after death (Tr. 1367, Line 15 to 1369, Line 18; Tr. 1373, Line 14 to 1374, Line 25). 
F. Injuries surrounding the anus were documented were again introduced as part 
of the autopsy testimony (Tr. 1106, Lines 22 to 25). Specifically, bruises about and around the 
anus with superficial tears were noted. Microscopic examination indicated the presence of 
hemorrhage and the inflammatory process indicating the injury was sustained three to four hours 
before death (Tr. 1110, Line 21 to 114, Line 4). The doctor surmised the injury was due to 
sexual activity but caused by an object such as a fist with a ring (Tr. 1114, Line 12 to 1115, 
Line 10). None of the injuries to the anus were at all life threatening (Tr. 1164, Line 17 to 
1169, Line 2). Dr. Gruwell testified that the injuries could have been sustained in the automobile 
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accident (on the gear shift) or earlier (Tr. 1304, Lines 5 to 23). 
F. A gray color swipe or streak pattern was found on the side of the chest and 
right elbow (Tr. 1105, Lines 7 to 18). 
G. The doctor observed a dark brown material adhering to the right thigh and 
abrasions to the left shin (Tr. 1105, Lines 17 to 24). 
H. A patch of soot, a quarter of an inch square, was located by the vocal cords 
with no finding of soot in the trachea or bronchi or localized swelling (Tr. 1117, Line 7 to 1119, 
Line 17). Dr. Gruwell testified that the location of the soot fragment in the epiglottis presumed 
a respiratory effort to inhale air to get the fragment lodged down into that part of the trachea. 
Dr. Gruwell testified that the chances of the fragment sliding down the throat with saliva were 
remote at best. He supported his opinion by the fact that no saliva was found in that location 
(Tr. 1193, Line 23 to 1196, Line 1). Dr. Gruwell testified that because an inhalation would have 
been necessary to ingest the fragment, it was his opinion that Shelly Jiron was alive at the time 
the fragment became lodged (Tr. 1298, Lines 10 to 16). 
I. Blood clots outside the rib cage with no reciprocal bruises were found, which 
corresponded to the swipes on the left side of the body identified above. No rib fractures were 
found and the doctor postulated that the finding was consistent with her body impacting the dash. 
Because of the absence of bruising, the doctor testified that the injury occurred after death (Tr. 
1121, Line 18 to 1123, Line 13). 
J. The doctor noted no injury to the neck and back externally, but internally 
found recent hemorrhage present in the paraspinal muscles located on both sides of the backbone 
from the third cervical vertebrae to the first thoracic vertebra. The doctor testified that the 
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injury could have been caused by a blunt object that would not cause bruising or abrasions or 
from someone pushing or squeezing the area. Under microscopic examination the doctor 
observed the presence of recent hemorrhage and concluded that the injury was, as with the anal 
injuries was done three to four hours before death (Tr.1123, Line 16 to 1126, Line 3). On 
cross-examination the doctor admitted that the victim was alive when the injuries in the neck 
area were suffered. If done while alive, the doctor admitted that the injury could be caused by 
the trauma of the crash (Tr. 1169, Line 25 to 1170 Line 24). The doctor testified unequivocally 
that the injuries were not life threatening (Tr. 1170, Lines 22 to 24). Doctor Gruwell testified 
that the injury could easily have been caused by a car going forty miles per hour over rough 
terrain. That injury together with the chest injuries are often seen in auto accident cases (Tr. 
1302, Line 3 to 1303, Line 9). 
K. The doctor found no superinflation of the lungs or accumulation of mucous 
consistent with an asthma attack (Tr.1119, Line 14 to 1121, Line 13). The level of carbon 
monoxide was less than 10% which was normal, but there was evidence of toluene and xylene 
in the vitreous fluid of the eye, indicating that the victim inhaled gasoline vapors that entered 
her blood stream while she was alive (Tr. 1127, Line 19 to 1128, Line 17; Tr. 1172, Line 10 
to 1174, Line 10). Dr. Gruwell agreed that the chemicals were an indication of the inhalation 
of gasoline and the fact the levels were low indicated that they had been dissipated by respiration 
and were at that level at the time of death (Dr. Gruwell noted that the chemicals dissipate very 
quickly and that was the reason the chemicals were not found in Mr. Jiron's blood (Tr. 1305, 
Line 3 to 1308, Line 25). 
51. Doctor Leis concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia. The mechanism of that 
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process is something the doctor did not know and could not determine from the evidence (Tr. 
1186, Lines 3 to 12). The doctor testified that the predeath injuries were hemorrhages to the 
back of the neck, the injury surrounding the anus and the hemorrhage or petechiae in the eyes. 
The postdeath injuries were the slippage of the skin (Tr. 1128, Line 18 to 1129, Line 12). None 
of the typical findings of strangulation were found including petechial hemorrhage in the oral 
mucosa, bruising and marks around the neck, tracheal damage or other indentations (Tr. 1148, 
Line 7 to 1152, Line 3). None of the injuries individually or cumulatively were life threatening 
according to Doctor Leis (Tr. 1168, Line 16 to 1169, Line 2). Dr. Gruwell testified that choking 
is caused by a substance being ingested, going by the oral pharynx and the posterior throat, 
getting past the epiglottis and then being introduced into the trachea. When that happens, the 
body reacts by the coughing mechanism to try to expel the substance. During this process, a 
spasm of the epiglottis can occur where it contracts to it's maximal state closing the area over 
the trachea. The soot in this case could have produced that response which would have been 
life threatening and would have produced anoxia. Then upon death or serious brain damage, 
the brain ceases sending out neuro causing the organ to relax and return to it's normal position 
(Tr. 1296, Line 2 to 1299, Line 19). Dr. Gruwell testified that the reason no additional soot 
was found was because the victim choked, causing a spasm of the epiglottis, where the victim 
struggled for air for three to seven minutes, causing brain damage and ultimately stoppage of 
the heart (Tr. 1300, Line 1 to 25). That process, Dr. Gruwell testified, is consistent with the 
finding by Mr. Jensen of a pulse in the carotid artery. At that time the breathing function had 
ceased and the lower portion of the brain was still prompting the heart to beat for a period of 
time after respiration had ceased (Tr. 1301, Line 10 to 1302, Line 2). Dr. Gruwell testified that 
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since graduating from medical school in 1975 he had seen wounds perpetrated by violence and 
none of the evidence would lead him to believe that violence was perpetrated on the Shelly, Jiron 
(Tr. 1309, Line 13 to 1312, Line 14). In rebuttal, Dr. Leis testified that the absence of more 
soot and materials along the trachea or reaction of tissue to hot air led him to believe there was 
no spasm but conceded that he had never observed a laryngeal spasm (Tr. 1369, Line 19 to 
1372, Line 13; Tr. 1374, Line 18 to 1375, Line 23). 
52. As to the length of time the body had been dead at the time of the examination at 
American Fork Hospital on December 17, 1991 at 10:05 where a core temperature reading of 
85.7 degrees was made, the doctor testified the death occurred eight and a half hours earlier, 
give or take an hour (Tr. 1129, Line 13 to 1131, Line 6). When confronted with the testimony 
of Mr. Jensen, who said that upon arriving at the scene, he felt a pulse and the body was warm, 
the doctor testified that he would have to take that evidence as more reliable (Tr. 1177, Line 7 
to 1178, Line 22). Doctor Gruwell questioned the propriety of the using the Synergy rectal 
temperature probe in the manner employed by the nurses of the American Fork Hospital and 
questioned the correctness of the reading obtained (Tr. 1268, Line 8 to 1272, Line 25). 
Additionally, given the outside temperature on the night of the accident, the fact the victim was 
wearing no clothing, Dr. Gruwell testified that the loss of heat would exceed 1 and one-half 
degrees an hour (Tr. 1273, Line 1 to 1275, Line 7). 
H. Testimony Relating to the Investigation of the Fire in the Vehicle. 
53. Brent Halladay, employed in the office of the Utah State Fire Marshall, testified 
concerning his investigation. When he arrived at the scene on the evening of December 17, 
1991, he found the car windows were rolled up and intact with the exception of cracks in the 
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front windshield and had a light soot residue (Tr. 1030, Line 1 to 1031, Line 4). The vehicle 
ignition was still in the "on" position and the car fan and door chime activated (Tr. 1033, Line 
16 to 1034, Line 5). Gasoline was found in the back seat, directly behind the passenger seat. 
The back rest of the passenger front seat was laid back as far as possible and the lower two-
thirds of that back rest were saturated with gasoline. The carpet and pad directly in front of the 
passenger seat was saturated as well as the center console which had splatters. There was also 
some small saturation on the inside of the driver's seat, on the lower bottom cushion. No other 
gas saturation was found (Tr. 1034, Line 6 to 1036, Line 8). 
54. As it relates to burn damage, there was a little sooting on the dash, but basically very 
minimal burning and light scorching. The velour covering of the headliner had been burned. 
The upper portion of the passenger and driver's seat showed scorching (Tr. 1036, Line 9 to 
1037, Line 18). 
55. Mr. Halladay testified that the flammable limits of gasoline compared to the 
percentage of air is one to seven percent. Given the amount of gas poured and the fact that the 
windows were rolled up, Mr. Halladay indicated that it would be hard to ignite the inside of the 
car but because gas is heavier than air, and the fact that the defroster was running, it would be 
lit easier closer to the top of the car than seat level (Tr. 1040, Line 18 to 1043, Line 6). 
56. Mr. Halladay testified that the fire was intentionally set. Specifically, he testified 
that the driver with the gas can in his right hand started pouring gas in the back seat which was 
facilitated by the passenger seat back being reclined. The gas can was brought forward, pouring 
gasoline into the passenger seat and on to the floor area, splattering some on the inside of the 
passenger seat, center area and driver's seat (Tr. 1043, Line 11 to 1045, Line 9). 
30 
57. A book of matches with ten matches expended was found on the floor on the driver's 
side which was completely burned. Two burnt matches were found on the floor by the driver's 
seat. Two burnt matches and one unburnt were found on the driver's seat. From the evidence 
relating to the matches, Mr. Halladay testified that attempts were made to light the fire which 
finally succeeded as the defroster injected more air in the car to dilute the concentration of gas 
vapors. The fire extinguished quickly. Mr. Halladay testified that the fire occurred before 
impact because the driver's impact against the front windshield wiped soot off the window 
indicating that the soot was on the window before the final impact of the driver's head with the 
windshield (Tr. 1043, Line 7 to 1051, Line 12; Tr. 1055, Lines 17 to 25; Tr. 1061, Line 16 to 
1062, Line 5). 
58. Mr. Halladay conceded that there was nothing by which he could date when the 
matches were ignited and had to assume they were lit around when the fire in the automobile 
was started (Tr. 1058, Line 18 to 1059, Line 19). A cigarette lighter was introduced as being 
found in the vehicle when it was searched. Mr. Halladay testified that the search at the scene 
failed to uncover a lighter of any kind despite his careful search. Additionally, the lighter that 
was found was in the victim's purse and was not subjected to any testing as to fingerprints or 
as a source of the source of the start of the fire in the vehicle (Tr.982, Line 3 to 987, Line 17; 
1059, Line 20 to 1060, Line 19). Additionally, the matches that were found that were not 
ignited were never sent for testing or to obtain a fingerprint comparison (Tr. 1061, Line 13 to 
1068, Line 2). 
59. Mr. Halladay testified that with gasoline vapors, it takes only one quarter of one 
millijoule of electricity to ignite a fire. He testified that the static obtained walking across a 
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wool rug used to shock another person created 10 milijoules of electricity, forty times the 
amount necessary to ignite gasoline vapors. The turning of a switch sometimes creates enough 
to ignite vapors (Tr. 1062, Line 17 to 1064, Line 3). Even the static from taking a wool 
sweater off could ignite the fire (Tr. 1091, Lines 15 to 20). The car was never examined in a 
garage or laboratory. No instruments were used to test the circuitry in the car either under the 
hood or within the dash of the vehicle (Tr. 1065, Line 3 to 1066, Line 25). Mr. Halladay did 
not reconstruct the accident and determine the forces at play as the car careened down the ravine 
(Tr. 1074, Line 25 to 1075, Line 15). The fogging of the windows caused by the spillage of 
gasoline on a cold night also was not considered (Tr. 1077, Line 24 to 1078, Line 12). Mr. 
Halladay did testify that the passenger floor mat, found on the passenger side appeared to be 
chemically affected by exposure to gasoline for a considerable period of time (Tr. 1096, Line 
16 to 1098, Line 18). 
60. Mr. Halladay testified that the fire lasted for under a minute and that the deprivation 
of oxygen was the cause of the extinguishment of the fire. The lowering of the oxygen content 
in the air to twelve to fifteen percent, which is necessary to extinguish a fire is the same limit 
that is inadequate to support human life and cause a person to go unconscious, twelve to fifteen 
percent (Tr. 1081, Line 3 to 1082, Line 25). 
61. Mr. Proctor, the accident reconstructionist testified that the vehicle was traveling 
over forty miles per hour when it left the roadway. Given the fact that there were no restraints 
used by the occupants, Mr. Proctor testified that the only person that could have stayed in the 
seat was the driver because he had the steering wheel to hold. Anything else including persons, 
baggage, cans would be flying around the interior. Mr. Proctor testified that his reconstruction 
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revealed that the spill pattern found in this case could have been duplicated by the track of the 
car off the road to it's final resting spot with the gas can jostling about. Additionally, he 
surmised that the gas could have spilled in the back seat and before they can on the side of the 
road, the gas ignites causing the accident (Tr. 1347, Line 5 to 1358, Line 19). 
H. The Defendant's Background, Amnesia and Recollection of the Critical Events. 
62. The Defendant was born on February 3, 1968, and was twenty-three at the time of 
the alleged crime. The Defendant had resided in Utah all his life and was one of thirteen 
children. The defendant had made his living in construction and most recently, been involved 
in drywall and metal stud framing. Mr. Jiron completed the ninth grade (Tr. 1206, Line 23 to 
1209, Line 6). 
63. The Defendant had met the victim, Shelly Conk or Jiron when she was nine years 
of age at a church gathering. Mr. Jiron started to date Shelly when he was fifteen and she was 
fourteen. They were married when she was sixteen years of age and Joe was seventeen. The 
parties had two children, Dana, age six; and David, age three and a half (Tr. 1210, Line 1 to 
1212, Line 1). 
64. The parties separated in November or December of 1988 and divorced in July of 
1989 (Tr. 1212, Lines 1 to 16). During the period of their separation, Shelly and the defendant 
met and had sex on one occasion (Tr. 1212, Line 1 to 1213, Line 25). 
65. The Defendant then married Dawn Antonsen on September 14, 1990, and there was 
one child born as issue of that marriage, to wit: Brittany Lee Jiron (Tr. 1214, Lines 1 to 16). 
The defendant and Dawn lived together for about three or four months. In approximately 
January of 1991, the parties separated. When the Defendant purchased a home in October of 
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1991, Dawn and the defendant started seeing each other again (Tr. 1216, Line 8 to 1217, Line 
13). The Defendant testified that the problems in the relationship included the fact that there was 
no physical contact between them (Tr. 1217, Line 17 to 1218, Line 1). The defendant testified 
that the financial problems were not significant. He had planned and was able to finance a home 
around the obligations he had (Tr. 1218, Line 2 to 1219, Line 8). 
66. The parties stipulated that if called, Dr. Jeffrey Stoffal, the director of the University 
of Utah Burn Center would testify that the defendant, Joe Jiron, was treated with medication 
which has a common side effect of producing memory loss; that the defendant received a 
concussion and that memory loss would be expected with that injury; and, the traumatic nature 
and extent of the injuries suffered by the defendant contributed to his memory loss (Tr. 1262, 
Lines 3 to 18). The defendant testified that he had no memory of the incident and particularly 
the events of December 16 and 17, 1991. Additionally, memory of other aspects of his life was 
also affected (Tr. 1219, Line 19 to 1220, Line 25). 
67. As to the week before the incident, the defendant remembers having a toothache that 
had plagued him since April of 1991 (Tr. 1221, Lines 7 to 23). The defendant remembered the 
bill from the Office of Recovery services in the approximate amount of $500.00 but, as testified 
to by Dawn Jiron, was not upset about it (Tr. 1222, Lines 2 to 13). The Defendant testified that 
he found the bottle of scotch he purchased. He testified that was the first bottle he had bought 
since buying the house and that there was only two or three shots missing from the bottle (Tr. 
1222, Line 14 to 1223, Line 2). The defendant remembered being ill before his brother's 
wedding with an ailment in his inner ear that causes him to lose equilibrium. He testified that 
he did not recall buying sleeping pills but would have purchased anything that might have helped 
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with his condition. 
68. The defendant remembers attending his brother's wedding and some of the events 
he participated in and remembers having a good time. However, the defendant does not recall 
going back home, the event of Sunday, going to work on Monday or writing or signing the 
paper regarding his possessions and the house with Dawn. The defendant had no memory of 
buying another gas can or the events at K-Mart (Tr.1229, Line 20 to 1234, Line 7). The 
defendant testified that if he was in the Springville area and had car problems, he would call him 
mother first and then Shelly for help (Tr. 1233, Line 19 to 1234, Line 9). 
69. The Defendant gave a video taped statement of his recollection of the facts giving 
rise to the accident while still in the burn unit at the University of Utah Hospital, suffering from 
his injuries. A transcript of that statement was read to the jury. In it, the Defendant stated that 
his only memory was as he was pulling out of the driveway at his home in Kearns. The 
statement contained the Defendant's frustration in seeing his children and a statement that he got 
especially angry in October, 1991 because of the complications and slammed the phone down, 
smashed a ceramic piece and punched holes in the couch and closet and then cooled down. 
Additionally the Defendant stated that he and a friend, Ed Hunter had both made comments that 
if their ex-wives were dead, it would be easier on both of them. The Defendant answered that 
his relationship with Shelly was such that they had sex on occasion and both were willing to help 
the other out. Additionally, the Defendant stated that there had been prior encounters in the car 
with Shelly and that in those sexual encounters, she would occasionally take off her clothes and 
was not always in a hurry to put them back on. The Defendant did not recall having anal sex 
with her. The defendant did not have an explanation of her death and denied entertaining 
35 
thoughts of suicide (Tr. 720, Line 1 to 762, Line 11). 
70. The defendant testified that he had a myriad of problems with his 1978 Mercury 
automobile. The car would cut out, the headlights would turn off while the car was operating 
and the engine had to be partially rebuilt. The defendant remembered his father-in-law buying 
a gas can but also remembered that the funnel on the can did not fit in the opening on the car 
and that he had to use a funnel that was used for transmission fluid (Tr. 1234, Line 8 to 1236, 
Line 11). 
71. The defendant adamantly denied any contemplation of suicide (Tr. 1223, Line 3 to 
1225, Line 17). Even with the pain of the burns and the discouragement with the scarring and 
permanent disabilities, the defendant has never contemplated taking his own life (Tr. 1225, Line 
17 to 1226, Line 19). 
72. The defendant testified that He and Shelly, during the time of his separation from 
Dawn would meet at his or her request and talk about their problems. Joe and Shelly met and 
had sex in March of 1991 (Tr, 1227, Line 17 to 1228, Line 10). The defendant did not recall 
having anal sex with Shelly but testified that he would if she had introduced it (Tr. 1228 Line 
8 to 1229, Line 8). Additionally, it would not have been unusual for Shelly to keep her clothes 
off after an encounter (Tr. 1236, Line 18 to 1237, Line 9). 
73. The defendant always had strong feelings for Shelly. Shelly was his first love. The 
Defendant had known of others she was dating and testified that her dating would not have 
caused him any trouble (Tr. 1237, Line 13 to 1239, Line 15). In fact, Shelly had dated and had 
sex with other men during her marriage to the defendant and while they were separated and the 
defendant's response was to break off their relationship (Tr. 1246, Line 22 to 1248, Line 24). 
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74. The defendant has had a number of relatives involved with death or damage from 
fire and feared the consequences of it greatly (Tr. 1239, Line 23 to 1241, Line 4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant conviction. 
The evidence taken as a whole is sufficiently inconclusive and inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crimes. Specifically, there was insufficient evidence that the victim died by criminal means. 
For argument sake, even if death by criminal means could be established, there was no evidence 
that the Defendant acted knowingly or intentionally. 
The trial court erred in failing to grant the Defendant's Motion for a new trial based upon 
newly discovered evidence consisting of Defendant's restored memory. The proffered testimony 
was ruled by the trial court to be "newly discovered." The trial court ruled however that the 
proffered testimony contained in the affidavit of the Defendant was cumulative. The Appellant 
contends that the trial court's ruling that the evidence was cumulative is clearly contradicted by 
the record which has little or no testimony on many of the points dealt with by the proffered 
testimony. The Appellant further contends that the trial court's ruling that the proffered 
testimony would not have led to a different result is erroneous. Inasmuch as the new evidence 
would allow the Defendant to testify and provide the Jury with a reasonable explanation of the 
events leading to the death of Shelly Jiron, the effect on the outcome would be significant. 
Additionally, the events during the key time periods leading to the death were established by 
circumstantial evidence and the proffered testimony would provide direct evidence concerning 
the time periods that the jury was required to subject to speculation. 
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Third, the trial court errored in failing to take action when the prosecution changed it's 
theory of the case in closing argument. For the first time, the prosecution suggested to the Jury 
during closing argument that the victim might have been killed by the fire as opposed to a place 
and time hours earlier. The trial court upon hearing the objection by the defense should have 
tried to cure the error by instruction, mistrial or the granting of a new trial. 
Fourth, the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury based upon the comments made 
by the prosecutor in closing argument that the death may have been caused by the fire. The trial 
court should have instructed the jury that if they found that death was caused by the fire, they 
could not convict the Defendant of Arson which would then be an included element of homicide. 
Fifth, the trial court errored in admitting testimony and pictorial evidence of the anal 
injuries of the victim. The evidence was not relevant and the prejudicial effect outweighed any 
probative value. 
Sixth, the trial court errored in admitting evidence of the love letter from Norman to 




THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
AND ARSON. 
A. The Standard of Appellate Review Relating to Insufficiency of the Evidence. 
In reviewing the claim of a defendant that he was convicted on insufficient evidence, the 
Utah Supreme Court has established that: 
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The proper standard of review for appeals concerning the 
sufficiency of evidence is well established. In making the 
determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to 
uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a 
second fact finder. It is not the function of a reviewing 
court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility 
of witnesses. The mere existence of conflicting evidence, 
therefore, does not warrant reversal. Rather, the function of 
a reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is 
sufficient competent evidence to enable a jury to find, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. 
State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991)(footnotes omitted). 
B. The Proof Necessary to Warrant a Conviction of Criminal Homicide and Arson. 
The Defendant was charged with violating the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 76-5-
201 and 203 (1953 as Amended) which requires that the State prove that the Defendant 
knowingly and intentionally caused the death of another. Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953 
as Amended) requires that the State prove that the Defendant unlawfully and intentionally 
damaged the property of another by fire. Utah Code Annotated 76-2-103(1) and (2) (1953 as 
Amended), defines "knowingly" and "intentionally" as follows: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in 
the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is 
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a 
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct 
is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
The Defendant contends that the evidence in this case does not prove the elements of 
knowingly and intentionally killing another human being. Utah Code Annotated 76-1-501 (1953 
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as Amended) requires that each element of a charge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The statute then defines "element of the offense" to mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the 
definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-l-501(a) and (b) (1953 as Amended). 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the statutes set out above require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death occurred, that it occurred by criminal means, that the 
defendant was responsible for the crime, and that the defendant acted with the requisite criminal 
intent. Of course, the first two of the requirements, proof that the victim is dead and proof that 
the victim died by criminal means, constitute the corpus delicti. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983). 
C. Summary of the Evidence in This Case, 
The appellant has attempted, in the Statement of Facts, to provide a complete outline of 
the evidence adduced at trial. That evidence is summarized here. 
There is no question that the Defendant and Shelly Jiron, the alleged victim, has known 
each other since they were children, having met at a church outing. They had started dating 
when the defendant was fifteen and Shelly was fourteen. Two years later, they were married 
and then parented two children. Shelly and the Defendant separated, indisputably in 
approximately November of 1988 and were divorced in 1989. There was evidence that during 
the divorce proceedings and for some time thereafter, there was friction between the parties. 
Specifically, there was evidence of restricted visitation rights and feelings on the issue of custody 
40 
and visitation. Despite all of the haranguing on that issue, there was absolutely no evidence of 
any violence perpetrated on Shelly by the Defendant. In fact, there was no evidence of any 
violent behavior of the Defendant at all. 
The prosecution was allowed to go into great detail concerning the fact that one of the 
reasons for the failure of the marriage between the Defendant and Shelly Jiron was her infidelity 
with the Defendant's brother. Yet, in all of that evidence, the prosecution could not establish 
any inappropriate reaction to the affair by the Defendant. No violence was acted out upon 
Shelly or his brother; instead, the Defendant simply initiated divorce proceedings. 
The evidence introduced by the State established itself that Shelly and Joe Jiron met and 
talked with each other frequently, after the divorce, about their problems and continued to have 
sex. That evidence illustrates the shot-gun approach by the prosecution. On one hand, the State 
attempted to introduce three year old evidence of an affair and problems with child visitation 
apparently to establish the Defendant's violent and vindictive behavior towards Shelly Jiron; and 
then conversely, establish that the Defendant and Shelly Jiron remained close and were reliant 
on each other to help with the trials of life. The evidence clearly establishes that despite the fact 
that the parties went through Shelly's affair, problems with visitation and each other's 
subsequent marriage or relationship, the Defendant and Shelly Jiron remained close and had no 
violent episodes between them. 
The culmination of the State's use of innuendo was the introduction of the love letter 
from Norman, Shelly's boyfriend. The State was allowed to introduce the letter outlining 
Norman's love for Shelly and supposedly Shelly's affection for Norman, without any proof, by 
eye witnesses or forensic evidence, that the Defendant ever touched, read or knew about the 
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letter. Even if the Defendant had read the letter, there is absolutely nothing in the record that 
would indicate that the Defendant, who was still married himself, would deem himself in a 
position to violently react to the fact that Shelly Jiron had a boyfriend. 
The State's recreation of the days before Shelly's death does not establish relevant 
information concerning Shelly's death. The evidence was that Joe Jiron's marriage to Dawn 
Antonsen had been on the ropes since it began. The Defendant and Dawn were separated more 
than they were together. Additionally, when they were together, a physical relationship was 
apparently lacking. There is no question that on the Friday before the incident, a notice from 
the Office of Recovery Services was received by the Defendant and his wife, Dawn. However, 
there is no evidence that the amount outlined in the letter was significant in light of the parties' 
income or other expenses. Even according to Dawn, the Defendant did not react to reading the 
correspondence. 
The evidence relating to the Defendant's apparent intent to commit suicide is specious 
and has little to do with a motivation to kill one of the Defendant's closest friends. The 
testimony concerning the sleeping pills was conflicting. First, the State introduced testimony 
that the Defendant might have bought sleeping pills, the ingestion of which were not life 
threatening, and took them on the night he bought a bottle of Scotch and ordered pizza. Then 
the State offered testimony that when Dawn called the Salt Lake County Sheriff, she told them 
that Joe did not have any weapons but had the sleeping pills with him. One has to question what 
either scenario establishes. The overwhelming weight of the evidence was that Joe Jiron was 
ill and was suffering from the flu at home and when he attended his brother's wedding (by the 
way, the wedding of the brother that allegedly had an affair with his wife which illustrates the 
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lack of vindictiveness). Otherwise, he was in good spirits as established by his conduct at the 
wedding and the pleasant Sunday night he had with his family. There is no question that on 
Monday, December 16, 1991, the Defendant and Dawn had a discussion in which Joe expressed 
his desire to give up. The State portrayed that as intent on the Defendant's part to commit 
suicide. However, even Dawn, after cooling down, indicated that she expected Joe to drive 
around and then return in a day or so. In light of the long history of separations, Dawn had 
extensive experiences with their disagreements and separations. Interestingly, no testimony of 
violent proclivities or conduct was elicited from Dawn regarding their relationship. 
The evidence that is most vindicating and dispositive of the suicide theory is the evidence 
that was introduced regarding the Defendant's trek from his home in Salt Lake to the time that 
Joe and Shelly end up in Wendover, Nevada. Regardless of the reason, Shelly went to Joe's aid 
because she perceived that the Defendant was having car trouble. Although the State implies 
that the car trouble was part of some intricate complicated plot, Joe and Shelly visited a number 
of people and Joe is seen in Shelly's company. All of the witnesses testified that both Joe and 
Shelly were happy and joking, enjoying each other's company. The evidence established a 
chronology consistent with perceived car trouble and then a planned trip that necessitated the 
placement of the children. The Defendant and Shelly Jiron end up in Wendover and the last 
evidence relayed to us of Shelly's perception, is the telephone call from Wendover, on the 
morning of December 17, 1991, where she relays that she and the Defendant were having a 
great time and that she and the Defendant were going to shower together. Any serious 
depression and corresponding suicidal intentions on the part of the Defendant are not established 
by evidence of December 16 and 17 or from Joe Jiron's past. In all of the Defendant's troubles 
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with relationships, there was no evidence of any suicidal tendencies. 
Evidence was introduced that the car that the Defendant had been driving had 
considerable problems. The State had sheriff department employees testify that their inspection 
revealed that the car had gas and started. However, within days of the car's release, Dawn Jiron 
was at the place of Defendant's employer asking for money because the car would not run. Joe 
Jiron did purchase a gas can, even though he had one in the back of his car. That purchase could 
have been explained by his loss of the key to the trunk, his lack of memory as to it's existence 
or a myriad of other explanations. It is hard to imagine that the Defendant intended the purchase 
of the gas can as part of a plot. He kept the can in the car during then entire trip to Wendover 
and back and took no efforts to hide it. If he had desired a gas can as part of some 
contemplated action, why wouldn't he have taken the can out of his own car and emptied the gas 
in it before Shelly arrived. Careful thought about the significance of the gas can purchase 
reveals that it is an unrelated fact to anything having to do with the motivation or intent of the 
Defendant. 
The evidence established that the victim, Shelly Jiron called Abelina Hunick at 10:11 
a.m. on the morning of December 17, from Wendover still contemplating showering with the 
Defendant and eating breakfast. The accident occurred on the west side of Utah Lake that 
evening at about 7:00 p.m. There is no evidence of what transpired between those times with 
the exception of the evidence found at the "second site." It is apparent that the parties stopped 
at that location, had sex and talked while Shelly smoked several cigarettes. Again, there was 
no evidence of violence or any altercation between the parties. It is at this stage that the State 
apparently abandons the theory that the Defendant was suicidal and had plotted to kill Shelly. 
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The prosecuting attorney speculated that the Defendant somehow saw the love letter directed to 
Shelly from Norman, went into a violent rage and killed the victim. There is absolutely no 
evidence that would support that conclusion other than sheer speculation. There is no evidence 
that the Defendant had any expectation of fidelity on Shelly's part. There was no evidence that 
the Defendant handled the letter or saw it's contents. Further from a practical standpoint, Mr. 
Jiron had only walked away from his relationship with his wife the day before. What possible 
explanation could be given to support the supposition of a violent reaction on his part to the 
letter about a relationship Shelly was having previously. Both had been through the same 
relationship problems and maintained their intimacy and friendship in spite thereof. 
The evidence from the accident site produced a witness, Mr. Fred C. Jensen, who was 
the first person on the scene. Mr. Jensen testified that he felt a pulse on Shelly Jiron's body and 
that her limbs were limp and not rigid. The evidence was that the fire in the vehicle preceded 
the final impact at the gully, but no one could testify by how far. The only evidence helpful in 
timing the fire, is that from Mr. Jensen who testified that the inside of the car, when he opened 
the door, was still warm, even though the outside temperature was seventeen degrees. The only 
reasonable conclusion is that the fire occurred while the car was proceeding down the highway, 
causing the Defendant to lose control and travel the nearly 750 feet to the final resting spot. It 
is highly unlikely that someone who wanted to kill himself and destroy evidence would pick the 
spraying of gasoline and an attempt to light a fire, in a moving car, as an effective or efficient 
means. 
There is no consensus that could be drawn from the evidence with regard to the time of 
death. There were significant questions relative to the use of the Synergy rectal probe to obtain 
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the temperature and significant conflict in the evidence relative to the onset of rigor mortis and 
lividity. Dr. Leis testified that he estimated the time of death to be eight and a half hours, give 
or take an hour prior to the time the core temperature was obtained, at 10:05 p.m. That 
calculation would put the time of death from 12:30 to 2:30 p.m., approximately five to six hours 
before the accident. Obviously, that opinion is in conflict with Mr. Jensen who felt a pulse when 
he first examined the occupants of the car. Dr. Leis testified that if the person had a reasonable 
degree of medical training, the evidence from the witness on the scene would be more reliable. 
As outlined in the statement of facts, Mr. Jensen had considerable experience in emergency 
procedures and dealing with dead bodies. 
The testimony was also in conflict on the amount of rigor mortis. The accounts of the 
paramedics and the medical examiner who noted only mild rigor mortis at 10:00 p.m. cannot 
be reconciled. Both doctors testified that the normal calculation of time of death derived from 
the core temperature would be affected by outside temperature, clothing and other factors. 
Inasmuch as no one was able to establish those factors, the time of death testimony is simply 
speculation. There is significant testimony that Shelly Jiron was alive at the time of the fire and 
the accident. The only testimony to the contrary is the core temperature evidence which was 
not only conflicting but unreliable because it was affected by elements of outside temperature, 
clothing and the like which were unknown factors and could not be taken into account by the 
doctors. 
The examination of the body also produced no definitive evidence of foul play. Dr. Leis 
concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia or deprivation of oxygen. Dr. Leis agreed that 
the mechanism of the death could not be determined and ruled out strangulation, blows to the 
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head and other means of inflicting trauma. The doctor testified that all of the wounds and 
injuries on the body were not life threatening. In summary, Dr. Leis testified that the predeath 
injuries were hemorrhages to the back of the neck, the anal injuries and the petechiae. The only 
postdeath injuries were slippage of the skin and on cross-examination, Dr. Leis testified that 
those could have been produced before or after the time of death. 
There was conflicting testimony on natural causes of death producing asphyxia. The only 
theory advanced by the prosecution was that Shelly Jiron, after having sex with the Defendant 
was suffocated by him, even though there was no evidence of a physical scuffle at the "second 
site." Additionally, there was no evidence of fighting or injuries to the defendant or to Shelly's 
body consistent with the movements of a person who is being strangled. It is the Defendant's 
position, that a finder of fact, to come to the conclusion that the Defendant intentionally and 
knowingly caused Shelly Jiron's death, had to engage in total speculation. Each of the elements 
set out above can be construed to fit a number of factual scenarios that do not involve foul play. 
The evidence concerning the fire investigation is important. Mr. Halladay testified that 
the gasoline spill appeared to be a pour consistent with a person starting with the can in the back 
seat and pouring gasoline on the cars seat as he brought his hand forward. However, that 
scenario is as consistent with the detection of the gas can in the back seat spilling and an attempt 
to reach back and get the can and replace a lid or stop the spill. The State's theory is advanced 
by the presence of the book of matches and individual matches that had been torn from the book. 
However, no evidence was found that the Defendant handled the match book or matches. 
Further, the victim used matches to light her cigarettes. The only lighter found was introduced 
late in the trial and the evidence that it had been located even in the vehicle was suspect. The 
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State's expert testified that the gas spill in the car could have been ignited by a small amount of 
electricity, equivalent to the amount from a static electric shock or that put off by a woman 
taking off a sweater. 
The evidence relied upon by the State as to the Defendant's combativeness in the 
ambulance was neutralized by the testimony of the same paramedics that combativeness and a 
desire to be left alone is often seen in trauma patients. 
Lastly, there was evidence of the Defendant's prior negative experience with burned 
family members, which would lead one to believe that Mr. Jiron would not chose that means 
to kill himself. 
There are a number of possible factual scenarios that are consistent with the evidence. 
A criminal cause of death, by suffocation, is not one of them. Significant machinations of the 
evidence has to be made to conclude that the Defendant somehow disabled Shelly Jiron and then 
suffocated her, without producing any corollary signs of struggle or injury. This Court has stated 
that when the evidence as viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt, as 
to the defendant's guilt, the verdict must be overturned. State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 
(Utah 1991)(footnotes omitted). 
In this case, each of the relevant pieces of evidence is consistent with accidental death. 
When the pieces of the puzzle are added one to another, there is simply no way that the evidence 
can be interpreted to produce one factual scenario proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Shelly 
died by criminal means. The entire case is more consistent with a death caused by accident. 
D. Prior Decisions Mandate a Reversal of the Homicide Conviction, 
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There is no question that in proving that the cause of death was by criminal means, the 
State may use circumstantial evidence. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). In that case, 
the victim was last seen with the defendant. When the body was discovered a year and a half 
later, the body was found in a carrot cellar, in a clearly unnatural positions. In that case, the 
testimony was uncontroverted that the body was dead when placed in the location where it was 
found. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti and that 
the position and location of the body supported that conclusion. IcL at 444. In another case, 
previously examined by this Court, the appellate court found that evidence that the upper jaw 
was fragmented and the middle upper cheek was missing from the body by force. The 
pathologist testified that the force necessary to cause the damage on the face would cause death. 
In those circumstances, the court held that there was sufficient evidence of criminal means to 
support the corpus delicti and admitted out-of-court statements. State v. Thomas, 222 S.C. 484, 
73 S.E.2d 722 (1952). See also, State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574-75 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Crawford. 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030, 1033 (1921). 
In State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), the Court determined that evidence 
establishing that the deceased baby was wrapped in the mattress cover belonging to the 
Defendant when it was discovered, that the Defendant was overheard to have admitted to the 
crime, his concealment and hindrance of the investigation, and the inability to explain the 
existence of the mattress cover in light of his kidnapping theory, sustained a finding that the 
defendant was responsible for the death. IcL at 784-89. 
James then claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the requisite 
intent. Before the Court sustained the verdict, a litany of the evidence establishing the intent 
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was provided by the Court. The evidence included the fact that the child was left with the 
Defendant the morning of the disappearance; the defendant upon being brought to the station told 
the child's mother that he didn't do it on purpose and that he was sorry; evidence of prior abuse 
on the child by the defendant; attempts to hinder the investigation of the disappearance; major 
inconsistencies in the evidence supporting a kidnapping by other persons; and, the location of 
the child in a mattress cover belonging to the defendant and the confession of the defendant to 
another third person. LI 
Certainly, the evidence in this case is not even close to the evidence accumulated in 
James, supra. In State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the defendant was convicted 
of murder as a result of events that occurred while the victim and the defendant were having 
consensual sexual intercourse. It was established that the defendant and the victim were 
intoxicated and that the electrical cord attached to the victim's clock radio was placed around 
the victim's neck and that the defendant pulled on the cord lightly for a short time. The cord 
around the neck was the uncontroverted cause of death. The Court held that because there was 
neither evidence of a fight or struggle between the two, nor evidence of any intent on the part 
of the defendant to injure the victim, the Court reduced the conviction from murder to 
manslaughter. The Court held that the jury could not have reasonably found evidence that the 
defendant's act of pulling on the cord was done with the requisite intent for murder. Id at 1219-
21. 
In the cases where the Court has sustained a First Degree Felony Murder using 
circumstantial evidence, there was always substantial evidence relating to the circumstances of 
death and motive of the Defendant. State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988) (evidence of 
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skull fracture while in defendant's care); State v. Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) (evidence 
that the defendant pointed gun at the victim and shot sufficient to convict defendant of second 
degree murder); State v. Maetas. 652 P.2d 903, 905-07 (Utah 1982) (evidence that defendant 
pointed a gun out of car window and shot in the direction of the officer deemed sufficient to 
support conviction of first degree murder); 
In this case, the jury was forced to speculate as to the meaning of the evidence to be able 
to conclude both that the victim dies by criminal means and that the defendant acted with the 
requisite criminal intent. It cannot be assumed that because gasoline was spilled in the car that 
the defendant had anything to do with igniting the gas or somehow intended to start a fire. The 
two crucial pieces of evidence, relied upon by the state, the love letter from Norman and the 
book of matches, produced no evidence that the defendant handled them or used them as a 
means of perpetrating a murder. 
Appellant understands that credibility is an issue for the trier of fact. See, James, supra. 
819 P.2d at 784; State v. Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989); Booker, supra. 709 P.2d 
at 345; State v. wilson. 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977). Additionally, the jury has the right to 
accept the testimony of certain witnesses and discount conflicting testimony. Fillmore Prods, v. 
Western States Paving. Inc.. 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979). In sum, this Court has the right 
to assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict. State v. Stewart. 729 P.2d 
610, 611 (Utah 1986); Stewart v. Sate bv and through Deland. 830 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App.) 
1992); State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). When those tests are 
applied to the facts of this case, the State's burden still has not been met. Each piece of evidence 
and element of testimony may be construed in so many different ways, that speculation upon 
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speculation is required to deduce death by criminal means and the requisite intent. When, as 
here, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime with 
the requisite intent, the verdict must be overturned. State v. Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100 
(Utah App. Ct. 1993); State v. Johnson, supra, at 1156; State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 38 
(Utah 1989); State v. Verde, supra, at 124)., 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
A. The Legal Standard for Granting a Motion for a New Trial Based Upon Newly 
Discovered Evidence. 
The Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial based upon newly discovered evidence. 
The newly discovered evidence was in the form of the Defendant's partially regained memory. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the trial court to grant a motion 
in the interests of justice or when there is impropriety in the proceedings. Further, this Court 
has stated that when the request for a new trial is based upon the claim of newly discovered 
evidence, the evidence must meet three criteria: 
(1) it must be such as could not with reasonable diligence 
have been discovered and produced at the trial; (2) it must 
not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be such as to render 
a different result probable on the retrial of the case. 
State v. Gellatlv. 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (1969); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 
(Utah 1991). On Appeal, it is assumed that the trial court, who is vested with discretion in these 
matters, acted properly, unless the record clearly shows the contrary. State v. Williams, 712 
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P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); Logan City v. Carlsen. 799 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
and State v. James, supra, at 793. 
B. A Summary of the Newly Discovered Evidence, 
At the time of trial the prosecution and defense stipulated that if Dr. Jeffrey Stoffal, the 
Director of the University of Utah Burn Center was called, he would testify to three important 
facts: 
1. The Defendant, Joe Jiron, was treated with medication 
which has a common side effect of producing memory loss; 
2. That the Defendant sustained a concussion and that 
memory loss would be expected with that injury; and 
3. That the traumatic nature and extent of the injuries 
suffered by the Defendant contributed to his memory loss. 
Tr. 1262, Lines 3 to 18. Dr. Stoffal's proffered testimony was the only testimony elicited from 
either side on the issue of Defendant's amnesia. 
On May 7, 1992, the Defendant filed with the trial court, a nine page affidavit detailing 
facts that he had previously been unable to remember (R. 654 to 662; Addendum No. 1). 
Specifically, the Defendant testified by affidavit to the following facts: 
1. The Defendant had a dental appointment on December 12, 1991. Upon 
learning that his wife, Dawn had cancelled the appointment, the Defendant stayed home because 
he was not feeling well. While home, the Defendant ate pizza, took a nap and had at most, 
three shots of scotch. At no time did he purchase or take any sleeping pills (R. 661-62). 
2. On the morning of December 16, 1991, the Defendant called his employer to 
find out the job location for the day and left for that site. When he arrived, the defendant 
noticed that he did not have an extension cord and returned home to get one. At home, the 
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Defendant determined that it was an appropriate time to end his marriage to Dawn. The 
Defendant went around the house and determined the items that he wanted to take with him. 
The Defendant had Dawn get a pencil and pad so that she could write down the things that he 
wanted her to do for him. The Defendant then went out to the car and emptied the car so that 
he could load it with the things that he wanted to take with him (R. 660-61). 
3. At the time he was preparing the car for the items he wanted to take from the 
house, or at a time subsequent, Dawn asked the Defendant what he wanted to do about the 
house. In response to that query, Mr. Jiron indicated that his wife could have it (R. 660). 
4. The Defendant then left the house to fill the car with gas and fill the air shocks 
on the car so that he could haul his possessions from the house. The Defendant, while on route, 
realized that he had forgotten the gas key to the car and returned home to get it. After leaving 
the house, the Defendant, instead of going to the gas station, started to drive around to calm 
down. As he got to Springville, the car began experiencing car problems and accordingly, he 
drove to a vacant lot and decided to call Shelly Jiron for help (R. 659-60). 
5. The Defendant went to a bank to withdraw some money and waited for Shelly. 
After Shelly arrived they went to purchase a gas can and finally located one at K-Mart in 
Spanish Fork. While in Spanish Fork, they drove to old homes in that area. In response to 
Shelly's comment that she had been over in Wendover, the week before and had a good time, 
Shelly and the Defendant decided to go. The Defendant withdrew more money for the trip and 
Shelly made arrangements for the care of the children (R. 658-59). 
6. Shelly and the Defendant returned to Springville and stopped to fill Shelly's 
car and the gas can. As the Defendant filled Shelly's car, Shelly placed the filled gas can on 
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the floor of the passenger side in front of the back seat. Upon returning to the Defendant's car, 
the Defendant could not find the key to the gas tank and the parties decided to leave his car there 
and take Shelly's (R. 658). 
7. Mr. Jiron and Shelly proceeded to Shelly's mother's house in Orem, retrieved 
the kids and then dropped them off at Abelina Hunick's house. The Defendant and Shelly then 
left for Wendover. The parties gambled and drank. They decided to get a room. Joe assumed 
that Shelly was still going with Danny Kinder as a boyfriend. Shelly indicated that he wasn't 
and the parties decided to get one room together. The parties watched television, made love and 
slept (R. 658). 
8. On the morning of December 17, 1991, the Defendant went to take a shower 
as Shelly was calling Abelina Hunick. After the phone call, Shelly joined him and they made 
love again. The parties had breakfast, gambled some more and left. Shelly was tired and asked 
the Defendant to drive. Shelly told the Defendant to take the Tooele exit heading south because 
it was faster to Abelina's home. The parties made several stops at gas stations for food and to 
use the restrooms. The parties started talking about the Defendant's impending separation and 
about the prospect of the Defendant and Shelly getting back together again (R. 657). 
9. As the parties were nearing Abelina's home, Shelly suggested that the parties 
stop for a while. They located a dirt road and turned off. After they stopped the car kept 
rolling and Shelly held down the brake pedal as the Defendant placed a rock under the wheel. 
The parties talked for a while, then had sex which the Defendant described as "especially 
passionate and vigorous with the [defendant] lying on a fully extended seat and Shelly on top of 
[him]." The Defendant speculates that it is at that time that the gas can which was located on 
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the floor behind the seat became dislodged (R. 656). 
10. After sex, the parties exited the car because it was hot and the windows were 
fogged up. Shelly use the bathroom and had a cigarette which was lit by the book of matches. 
The parties became cold and returned to the car. As the parties started back towards the main 
road, Shelly and the Defendant both noticed that the car smelled strongly of gasoline (R. 656). 
11. The Defendant reached back for the can and pulled it to the front seat. As 
he was doing so, Shelly swore and the Defendant realized that he had spilled gasoline. Shelly 
took the can and did something with it. Both noticed that the gasoline was burning their skin. 
They decided that inasmuch as they were close to Abelina's house, that they would proceed 
there. Shelly was wiping gasoline from her and took off her top. The Defendant then saw a 
flash of light, closed his eyes, let go of the steering wheel and tried to reach for Shelly. The 
Defendant heard a hissing sound and his ears popped. The Defendant then felt the car tipped 
to the right and the Defendant jammed his foot next to the gas pedal. The Defendant was 
thrown about the car and lost consciousness (653-54). 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling and the Basis for Reversal. 
Judge Christensen, in his Ruling dated June 14, 1993, stated as follows: 
The Court has reviewed the affidavit of defendant filed in 
support of the claim of newly discovered evidence and finds 
that for the most part, Defendant's restored recollections 
are essentially cumulative of facts already submitted to the 
Jury covering the time up to when the car was deliberately 
parked on the dirt road west of the main road. From that 
point on (Para 48-53 of Defendant affidavit) it appears to 
the Court that the now recollections of the Defendant are 
nothing more that [sic] an attempt to bolster the theories 
presented by Defendant at trial with evidence which is merely 
cumulative to that already heard and considered by the Jury. 
The Court does not believe a different result would be reached 
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on a retrial if the Jury were permitted to consider the alleged 
new evidence now advance [sic] by the Defendant. 
R. 672. 
The trial court's opinion appears to take the prosecution's position in it's entirety that the 
evidence outlined in the affidavit is merely cumulative or irrelevant (R. 665-68). It is 
respectfully submitted that nothing could be further from the truth. 
At trial, the prosecution painted the events of December 12, 1991, the day the Defendant 
had the dental appointment, to Friday, December 13, 1991, the day the parties received the 
demand letter from the Office of Recovery Services, as dark and depressing days for the 
Defendant and that the Defendant was in fact suicidal. One of the pieces intregal to that 
portrayal was the allegation that Defendant purchased packages of sleeping pills. In response to 
the Motion for a New Trial, the prosecution stated: 
Paragraphs 1 through 7 of the Defendant's Affidavit are 
completely irrelevant to this case. Rosa Corales specifically 
identified the Defendant as the person who purchased grape 
juice and sleeping pills on December 12, 1991 at Dan's Food 
Store in Tavlorsville. . . . (Emphasis added). 
R. 668. In fact, Rosa Corales identified a cash register receipt from the store for that day and 
identified the purchase of the grape juice but could only testify that another item from "general 
merchandise" was purchased on that occasion. Ms. Corales had seen the Defendant in the store 
on previous occasions but could not testify that it was the Defendant who appeared at the store 
on December 12 or that the Sleepinal was purchased by him (Tr. 425, Line 9 to 426, Line 18; 
Tr. 426, Line 19 to 428, Line 13). Accordingly, the Defendant's testimony as contained in the 
affidavit is the first and only testimony the defense had that indicated that the Defendant stayed 
home from work on December 12 because he was not feeling well and because he wanted to 
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take a day off. Additionally, it was the only testimony from the defense that the Defendant did 
not purchase the sleeping pills (Tr. 1222, Line 14 to 1223, Line 2). 
Paragraphs 8 to 18 of the Defendant's affidavit deal with the events of December 16, 
1991, when the Defendant wrote the note to Dawn giving her the house and setting out a list of 
things she was to do. This is critical because the prosecution, using Dawn's testimony, 
theorized that the Defendant was suicidal and was giving her "everything" in contemplation of 
committing suicide. The State was allowed to introduce Dawn's testimony and that of her father 
that Joe was thought to be suicidal. The Defense had no affirmative testimony on the issue. To 
counter that argument in front of the trial court, the prosecution represented: 
. . . In large part the statements of the Defendant corroborate 
and substantiate the evidence presented by the State and 
the defense regarding those events. . . . 
R. 667-68. The State then recited from the opening statement of Defense Counsel as to the 
defense's theory. Theory is not evidence. Although the Defendant testified that he was not 
suicidal, he also testified that he had no detailed memory of this time period (Tr. 1232, Lines 
9 to 12). To characterize to the trial court that explicit testimony about separating, how he was 
not walking away without any property but in fact, was planning how to move the items he 
wanted, is important testimony is substantiate his claim that the note was written because the 
parties intended to separate and not because of a threat of suicide. The evidence would have 
also helped the defense in arguing to the jury that when Dawn finally said under cross-
examination that she thought he would be back in a day or so, that was really the sentiment of 
the discussion between her and the Defendant. Instead, the emphasis of the evidence was that 
Joe was suicidal and had refused help from the "elders" and was out the door to end it all by 
58 
suicide. The State's equating of argument and theories to evidence is ridiculous. Because of the 
amnesia, all the defense had was theories and that does not equate to evidence and to a plausible 
explanation of what really happened. 
Paragraphs 19 to 53 (R. 654-59), deal with the events from when Mr. Jiron called Shelly 
for help because of car problems to the flash of light, fire, loss of control of the vehicle and Mr. 
Jiron blacking out. The argument of the State to the trial court on this issue is the most blatant 
disregard of the state of the record: 
Paragraphs 45 through 53 are an attempt by the Defendant to 
explain how Shelly Jiron could have died accidently. The 
defense presented evidence and argued extensively to the jury 
that Shelly Jiron died during the fire and that the fire 
started accidentally. Expert testimony was presented and the 
argument were fully developed. The evidence presented now 
by Joe Jiron is merely cumulative of that theory already 
presented to the jury. 
R. 666. 
The fact is that there was no evidence as to a) why the Defendant called Shelly for help; 
b) why the parties ended up in Spanish Fork and disregarded the repair of the defendant's car; 
c) why the Defendant made two bank withdrawals; d) how the trip to Wendover evolved; e) the 
discussion about getting one room together; f) the events that took place, including the 
intimacies, at Wendover; g) the events that took place in their travels from Wendover to the 
"second site;" h) the reason the parties stopped at the second site and an explanation of the 
reclined seat, the toilet paper, the cigarettes, matches and other physical evidence found at that 
location; i) an explanation for the dislodging of the gasoline can; and j) a concrete sensible 
explanation of how the gas spilled, why Shelly took of her top, why the car went off the road 
at full speed and how the death and injuries occurred. 
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All of this testimony would be new and would give the jury evidence of what occurred 
as opposed to theorizing by the experts. For example, the testimony of Mr. Halladay that the 
gas spillage, in his mind, showed a deliberate spill by the arm of a person in the driver's seat 
pouring gas from the back to the front could be made consistent with the Defendant's 
explanation. The static electricity emitted by a wool sweater as it was pulled over Shelly's head 
is consistent with Mr. Halladay's testimony. 
In summary, the vacuum created by only patches of evidence and expert hypothecation 
could be replaced with evidence from the only person who could testify to the facts. 
Additionally, any image of the defendant, because of his failure to remember and explain the 
events would be eliminated. In examining the Defendant's affidavit, one thing is for sure, the 
evidence is not cumulative. The trial court erred in so ruling and the State, by it's summary of 
the evidence misguided the trial court. 
The trial court did not rule that the proffered evidence was not "newly discovered" 
evidence and therefore only the issues of whether the evidence was cumulative and would have 
lead to a different result at trial need to be addressed on appeal (R. 680). 
In addressing the issue, this Court in State v. Duncan. 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 
(1942): stated: 
Where disinterested testimony on the vital point in a case 
is very scant, newly discovered testimony on that point 
appearing from affidavits to be apparently reliable. . . 
and it appears that such evidence would change the result, 
a new trial should be granted. While the granting or refusing 
of the motion lies within the sound discretion of the court, 
where there is a grave suspicion that justice may have been 
miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital 
point which new evidence will apparently supply, and the other 
elements attendant on obtaining a new trial are present, it 
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would be an abuse of sound discretion not to grant the same. 
See also: State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Ames. 112 Idaho 144, 730 
P.2d 1064 (App. 1986); State v. Chavez. 87 N.M. 38, 528 P.2d 897, 899 (1974); Jensen v. 
Logan. 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708, 723 (1936). 
In State v. James. 781 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), the defendant made a motion for a new 
trial on the basis of a piece of evidence obtained from a Mr. Lisner, an inmate at the Utah State 
Prison, who testified that Ronald Peterson, a key witness for the prosecution, had told him he 
had fabricated his testimony at trial to obtain better treatment from the State on his case. Id. at 
793. In reversing the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial, the Court stated: 
. . . We disagree. Our review of the evidence presented 
in the case shows that evidence of an intentional or knowing 
killing, while sufficient, is not overwhelming or compelling. 
Without the evidence of a plan to kill the child which can 
be derived from Peterson's testimony, the evidence of an 
intentional or knowing killing is scant and susceptible 
to differing interpretations. . . Without Peterson's 
testimony. . . it is probable that the jury would have had 
a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant had the requisite 
intent to commit murder. 
Id at 795. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's state of mind from December 12 to 
December 17, together with the reasoning behind the movements of Shelly and Joe on December 
16 and 17, 1991, are pieces of the puzzle in this case upon which the attorneys, experts and 
jurors could only speculate. The events at the "second site" and events leading to the fire are 
devoid of any testimony and evidence other that what was found at the scene. The Defendant's 
testimony, establishing that there is a plausible explanation for the events including the fire and 
death, fill a void that cries out in this case to be filled. The difference between the speculation 
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of experts, theories of attorneys and direct evidence of a person who was there is clear and 
requires the granting of a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE 
THE DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
A. The Actions Constituting Prosecutorial Misconduct. 
The State had always maintained in this case that Mr. Jiron the Defendant, had caused 
the death of Shelly Jiron prior to the time that the parties left the "second site." It was the 
State's contention that Shelly Jiron was dead when the Defendant left the "second site" on his 
way down the road to where the car went off the highway and finally ended up in the gully. The 
opening statement given by the prosecution leaves no question about the State's theory: 
The evidence that will be presented to you will demonstrate 
Joe and Shelly were alive and together at the Wendover motel. 
They were alive and together at this other scene because Joe 
doesn't smoke. Someone was smoking and putting cigarettes 
out at that scene. That car was there, and they were there. 
When they left that scene. Shelly was deceased at the accident. 
(Emphasis added) 
Tr. 53, Lines 15 to 22. 
Finally, the medical examiner will tell you that there were 
injuries to Shelly's body. Shelly dies - the medical examiner 
will tell you that she dies by asphyxiation, lack of oxygen. He 
will tell you that there were some terrible injuries to 
her body, serious and severe bruising to her back, between 
her shoulder blades, which would not have killed her but would 
have disabled her. There were injuries consistent with 
strangulation or death by asphyxiation. (Emphasis added.) 
Tr. 55, Line 17 to 58, Line 2. 
The medical examiner will tell you. . .And his conclusion 
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was that she was deceased prior to the fire. (Emphasis added.) 
Tr. 56, Line 25 to 57, Line 10. 
Now, that's a general summary. There will be more detail. 
There will be more items of evidence that we'll put together 
to match up, but that will be the evidence principally in the 
case: the fact the defendant was suicidal; he wanted to die: 
he went out of his way to meet with this victim; he took her to 
Wendover; they were alone together; he set that fire. And the 
evidence will be that he killed Shelly Jiron and that he set the 
fire in order to kill himself and to destroy the body. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Tr. 57, Lines 11 to 20. 
After arguing in closing argument the same theory that Shelly Jiron was killed by the 
Defendant before he left the second site, the prosecutor then made the following statements, 
Even if you disregard Dr. Leis' testimony that Shelly was 
deceased before the fire, and accept the defense medical 
testimony that she may have died as a result of the fire, 
that doesn't help the Defendant, because he set the fire. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Transcript of Closing Arguments, page 15, Lines 4 to 9. 
Just for supposing. Throw out all of the evidence you 
have heard about her being deceased prior to the fire. Now 
throw out all of the evidence that you heard about time of 
death. Throw it all out and forget it for a minute. Joe is 
still guilty because he set the fire. 
(Emphasis added). 
Transcript of Closing Arguments, page 72, Lines 9 to 14. 
Our case doesn't fail if you decide that she was alive 
at the time of the fire. But that's not the case. The 
evidence doesn't demonstrate that. Neither does the State 
have to prove a particular motive. We have to prove that the 
defendant knowingly and intentionally killed Shelly. . . . 
Transcript of Closing Arguments, page 73, Line 23 to page 74, Line 4. 
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B. The Objection and the Trial Court's Ruling. 
Counsel for the Defendant objected to the argument at the time it was made (Closing 
Argument Transcript Page. 73, Lines 3 to 6). The trial court, instead of entertaining the 
defense's objection at the time, instructed the defense to renew the objection at a later time (R. 
597-98). In response to written motions requesting a new trial, the court ruled: 
In light of the Court's instructions, the Court does not believe 
that the Jury could have been misled as a result of the said 
statement of the prosecutor. It is noted that counsel for Defend-
ant alleges in his memorandum that some of the Jurors were in fact 
so misled, but there is no evidence to support such a contention in 
the record. 
R. 672-73. 
C. The Trial Court's Error. 
In Utah, a trial court may grant a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error 
or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. U.R.C.P. 
24(a). State v. Owens. 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Additionally, 
It is the rule that if improper statements are made by 
counsel during a trial, it is the duty of opposing counsel 
to register a contemporaneous objection thereto so that 
the court may make a correction by proper instruction and, 
if the offense is sufficiently prejudicial, declare a mistrial. 
State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987); State v. Cabututan. 213 Utah Adv. Rep 18, 
21 (Utah 1993). 
There is no question that it is improper for a prosecutor to refer to or argue on the basis 
of facts outside the record and to mislead the jury as to inferences warranted by the evidence. 
State v. Ferguson. 803 P.2d 676 (N.M. App. 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error when the misconduct "call[s] to the attention 
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of the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and, 
under the circumstances of a particular case, the error is substantial and prejudicial such that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result for the defendant." State v. Tillman, 750 P2d 546 (Utah 1987). 
The problem with the argument made by the prosecutor in closing argument is that it 
misled the jury as to the legal implications of their factual findings. In essence the State argued 
that the jurors could still find the Defendant guilty of both Arson and Homicide even if they 
found that the Defendant killed Shelly Jiron by setting the fire. That inference is clearly plain 
error and was not cured by the jury instructions. 
Instructions 7, 8, 9 and 10 (Addendum, Exhibit 2) outlined the elements of the crimes 
with which the Defendant was charged (R.492-95). However, although the instructions 
accurately state the elements of each of the crimes, the instructions do not deal with the 
circumstance of a factual finding that the homicide was caused by the Defendant's act of Arson. 
The trial court, upon hearing the objection to the prosecution's argument should have tried to 
cure the error by instruction, declared a mistrial or allowed a new trial. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203 outlines the circumstances comprising second degree 
Criminal Homicide. In this case, the Defendant was charged with section (a) in that he allegedly 
"intentionally and knowingly" caused the death of another. However, section (d) makes it clear 
that if a person, while in the commission of a myriad of crimes, including arson, causes the 
death of another, that also is second degree Capital Homicide. Accordingly, the jury should 
have been instructed that if the State was contending that it's theory was alternatively, that Shelly 
was killed by the Defendant as a result of the Arson, the jury could not find the Defendant guilty 
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of Arson as a separate offense in that Arson would then be a necessary element of second degree 
Criminal Homicide. 
The trial court's failure to take any action allowed the jury to believe that it could convict 
the Defendant of both crimes even if they found that the cause of death was Arson perpetrated 
by the Defendant, which is clearly contrary to the law and obviously violates the substantial 
rights of the Defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY BASED UPON THE PROSECUTOR'S 
STATEMENTS DURING CLOSING 
ARGUMENTS. 
The comments of the prosecutor during closing argument that are set out in Point III 
either constitute inappropriate comments as to the legal inferences that could be drawn from the 
evidence or the court, as argued in this point, failed to properly instruct the jury. 
The Defendant was charged with Second Degree Capital Homicide in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated 76-5-201 and 203 (1953 as Amended) in that he, as set out in section 203(a), 
intentionally and knowingly caused the death of another. Defendant was also charged with 
Arson, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-102 (1953 as 
Amended) in that he intentionally and unlawfully damages property of another. (R. 40). 
There is no question that the State theorized, to the time of the closing arguments, that 
the Defendant killed the victim at the "second site" and then subsequently, in an attempt to 
commit suicide, set the car on fire. Under that factual scenario, the jury was properly instructed 
as to the elements of the crime. However, when the State changed it's theory of the case in 
closing arguments and argued to the jury that they could find the Defendant guilty even if Shelly 
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was alive at the time the fire was set and in fact, her death was intentionally caused by the 
Defendant setting the car on fire, the instructions to the jury no longer accurately represent the 
law. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-203(d) (1953 as Amended), provides that a person is guilty 
of only Second Degree Criminal Homicide if the actor: 
while in the commission, attempted commission, 
or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of aggravated robbery, 
robbery, . . . aggravated arson, arson,. . . 
causes the death of another. . . .(Emphasis 
added.) 
Therefore, if the court did not chose to cure the statements of the prosecution by mistrial, 
the granting of a new trial, the only remaining alternative, was to cure the problem by 
instruction. The trial court should have instructed the jury that if they found that Shelly Jiron 
was killed by the actions of the Defendant in starting the fire, they could return a guilty verdict 
on the Criminal Homicide count, but could not return a verdict for Arson because Arson is a 
necessary element of Criminal Homicide under those facts. As the instructions were given (R. 
492-95), there was nothing that instructed the jury concerning the State's new found theory that 
the murder was committed as an instrumentality of Arson. 
This Court has stated that "the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on a lesser 
included offense only when there is a 'rational basis for the verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense'" State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 462 (Utah 1990); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983). Additionally, in order 
to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial, "a defendant's requested lesser 
included offense must be given when there is some evidence which support the theory asserted 
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by Defendant." State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988); State v. Day. 815 P.2d 
1345, 1348 (Utah App. 1991). 
The record in this case indicates that the defense objected to the comments at the time 
of trial and based part of the Motion for a New Trial on the error (Tr. 73, Lines 3 to 6; R. 596-
97). However, the failure to correct the statement of the prosecution or cure the error by 
instruction constitutes plain error. To establish plain error, the appellant must establish that a) 
an error exists; b) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and c) the error is 
harmful, i.e. absent the error, there is reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, the confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988): State v. 
Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, given the change in theory by the State, the jury could have found that 1) 
the Defendant committed the homicide and then, at a later time set the fire (under which 
scenario, the instructions are adequate); 2) the Defendant committed the homicide by setting the 
fire (which scenario is not dealt with in the instructions; 3) the Defendant did not commit the 
murder or did not commit the arson (which findings are dealt within the instructions). It is 
impossible to decipher from the verdict whether the jury found the homicide was committed 
before the arson or at the time of the arson. Given the theory submitted to the jury by the State, 
over the defendant's objection, it was plain error not to submit instructions to the jury explaining 
that under the State's new found theory, Arson is an included element of Homicide and that the 
evidence under that scenario could not support a separate conviction of arson. 
POINT V 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
AND TESTIMONY OF THE ANAL INJURIES 
TO THE VICTIM. 
The defense filed a Motion in Limine requesting the court to exclude testimony and 
pictorial evidence of the anal injuries of the victim (R. 60-66, Exhibit 12, Addendum, Exhibit 
3). The court denied the motion (R. 340-44). 
As carefully established in the Statement of Facts, there was continual reference to the 
anal injuries throughout the course of the trial. In fact, the prosecutor in his rebuttal remarks 
to the jury indicated that Shelly had been sodomized (Tr. 77, Line 1). 
The fact is that the uncontroverted evidence from Dr. Leis, the state's medical expert, 
was that the anal injuries were sustained three to four hours before death, were probably 
incurred during sex by the insertion of a fist or the like and had absolutely nothing to do with 
the cause of death. The pictures of the victim's anus are gruesome and were unfairly 
emphasized and exhibited to the jury. There is not a shred of evidence offered by the State 
indicating that the minor injuries were not suffered during consensual sex. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E. The establishment that the parties engaged in consensual sex 
both in Wendover and during sex, the victim suffered some minor anal tears is not relevant to 
intent and does not establish an increased probability that the Defendant committed the murder. 
The fact that the anal injuries were three to four hours old at the time of death puts the place 
of injury in Wendover. The court's reasoning that it showed intent or motive simply was not 
borne out by the evidence at trial (R. 343). 
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Even if the anal injury evidence was admissible, the court must consider the gruesome 
nature of the photograph and it's essential evidentiary value. State v. Garcia. 663 P.2d 60, 64 
(1984). Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice . . .or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. . . . 
On appeal, the Court must determine whether the trial court's finding that the evidence 
was admissible was "beyond the limits of reasonability," and that there is a reasonable 
likelihood, absent the error of an outcome more favorable to the Defendant. Sate v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, it is respectfully submitted that the constant reference to the anal injuries and 
anal sex in Utah County, although totally unrelated to the alleged crime had an "unusual 
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 
1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). In accordance with the 
decisions of this Court, that finding then places a presumption that the evidence's potential for 
unfair prejudice is presumed to outweigh it probativeness, and the burden is on the proponent 
to show that the evidence has unusual probative value. State v. Dunn. 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100, 
109 (1993); Laffertv, supra, at 1256. 
Given the facts of this case and the State's evidence, the testimony and evidence of the 
minor anal injuries blown up and paraded in front of the jury for the entire length of the trial, 
was prejudicial and distorted the deliberate process and skewed the trial's outcome. Dibello, 
supra., at 1229; Laffertv, supra., at 1256; Cloud, supra., at 753; Dunn, supra., at 109. 
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There was simply nothing to be drawn from the injury other than the fact that the parties 
had sex in Wendover and at the "second site" which facts were established by a number of 
exhibits and testimony. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. WHICH WHEN CONSIDERED 
TOGETHER CONSTITUTES CUMULATIVE ERROR. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court committed error with regard to a number 
of evidentiary ruling, which either entitle the Defendant to a new trial based upon their 
individual nature or, alternatively were cumulatively harmful. Under the cumulative error 
doctrine, the Court will reverse if the "cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [the 
Court's] confidence. State v. Dunn, supra, at 114; Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 
801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1146; (Utah 1989); 
State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); State v. RammeL 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 
1986). 
A. The Love Letter From Norman to Shelly Jiron Was 
Inadmissible, 
The Defendant filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the court exclude the letter 
(R.56-60). A copy of the love letter is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit 4. The court denied 
the motion (R. 330-33). In ruling on the motion, the trial court held that the letter would be 
admissible only if it was established that the Defendant had read the letter (R. 332). 
Accordingly, the court stated in it's ruling: 
However, as the Defendant rightly remarks, whatever relevance 
the letter may have toward establishing intent or motive is 
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conditioned upon the defendant's knowing of or reading 
the letter. (Emphasis added.) 
R. 332. 
Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence establishes that "where the relevancy of 
evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or 
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition." Defendant acknowledges that it is the duty of the trial court to determine whether 
the trier of fact could reasonable find the conditional fact, by the preponderance of the evidence. 
Huddleston v. United States. 485 U.S. 686, 690 (1988). 
In this case, the forensic workup on the letter failed to produce any fingerprint or other 
evidence that the Defendant ever saw the love letter from Norman. The evidence established 
that Shelly picked the letter up at her mother's house when she was picking up the children. 
There was no evidence that there was any discussion about the letter either at Shelly's mother's 
house or at Abelina Hunick's house, where the children were dropped off. The only evidence 
is that the letter was found opened and was found in Shelly's handbag. 
The Defendant contends that without more, there is not any evidence, let alone a 
preponderance, that the Defendant saw the letter. There was no testimony that the Defendant 
had looked in Shelly's handbag previously or was seen in a circumstance where he was 
examining her purse. The condition the court acknowledges was necessary as a condition 
precedent to admission was never furnished. To understand the prejudicial effect, one only has 
to review the Statement of Facts. The love letter is the only piece of evidence that the State can 
rely upon to show why the fun and happy attitudes that Shelly and the Defendant had towards 
each other when they visited Shelly's mother, Joe's sister, the casinos and motel in Wendover 
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suddenly changed. Without the letter, the State is left with its supposition that Joe was suicidal 
which would change the complexion of the case completely. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting Evidence of 
Marital Communication. 
The Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to Suppress Dawn Jiron's testimony of the 
events that occurred from December 12,1991 through December 16, 1991 including the contents 
of the handwritten note signed by the Defendant relating to the personal possessions that were 
to be returned and the disposition of the house (R. 300-321). In it's ruling the trial court found 
that the handwritten note and the conversations between the Defendant and his wife, Dawn, met 
the Requirement of Rule 502 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in that it was a marital 
communication and was confidential in that "it is made privately by any person to his or her 
spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person." Rule 502(b)(1) URE. The court 
noted that the marital privilege applies to written as well as oral communication (R. 348 citing 
State v. Galloway, 680 P.2d 268 (Kan. 1984). 
The court finding that the statements and handwritten notes were marital communication 
and confidential, ruled that they were admissible only by an exception to the privilege regarding 
marital communications, Rule 502(b)(4)(B). Specifically, the court ruled that the communication 
was not privileged if "made in whole or part to enable or aid anyone to commit, to plan to 
commit, or conceal a crime or tort." (R. 348-50). The logic apparently is that because the 
Defendant told his wife he was quitting and went through the disposition of property, those 
statements and the note are in furtherance of a plan to commit suicide and murder Shelly Jiron. 
The evidence at trial failed to produce any evidence that would establish the court's 
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position. Even Dawn admitted on the stand that she expected Joe to come back in a day or two. 
Further, what possible relevance can the disposition of Joe's property and his breakup with 
Dawn have on a plan to murder Shelly. 
The fatal flaw in the case is the absence of any evidence that links the separation with 
Dawn, and the note relative to property into a motive or intent to kill Shelly, who is a stranger 
to the whole scenario. 
The State by being allowed to introduce the love letter, the communications with Dawn 
and the note giving her the house was able to weave a cloth of supposition that was based 
entirely on other inadmissible evidence or speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction in this case. Even 
when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was not sufficient 
evidence that Shelly died by criminal means or that the Defendant acted with knowledge or 
intention. 
The testimony that the Defendant can now provide, as set out in his affidavit in support 
of his Motion for a New Trial based upon newly discovered evidence provides new testimony 
about aspects of the case that are crucial and have previously required the witnesses and jury to 
speculate. The court's finding that the evidence was cumulative is clearly contradicted by the 
record in this case and a new trial should be allowed to present the trier of fact with all of the 
evidence. 
The statement of the prosecution in closing argument changed the theory of the case. 
The Defendant was entitled to a mistrial, a curing instruction or a new set of jury instructions 
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outlining the options the jury had based upon the theory. Specifically, the failure of the 
instructions to provide that the jury could not convict the Defendant of Arson if it determined 
that he knowingly and intentionally killed Shelly by fire was essential. 
Finally, the trial court committed serious error with regard to key pieces of evidence. 
The Defendant was entitled to ruling that the evidence was inadmissible and this court, based 
upon the prejudicial effect of the evidence and improper foundation and a lack of relevance 
should overturn the conviction. 
In sum, this case should be remanded for a new trial with instructions as to the 
admissibility of the questioned evidence and testimony. 
DATED this {±L day of January, 1994. 
Steven B. Killpa$^Esq 
Attorney for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial 
DEAN N. ZABRISKIE #3599 :" ' " ' 'h 
Attorney for Defendant 
3507 North University Avenue, Suite 370 n . -^ 
Jamestown Square, Hanover Building ; 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7680 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOE F. JIRON 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOE F. JIRON 
Case No. 921400242 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Affiant, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled matter. 
2. At the time of the trial I had no memory of the incidents 
immediately prior to and including the accident on December 17, 
1991, west of Utah Lake, which provides the basis for the above-
entitled action. 
3. My memory has, to an extent, returned as it relates to 
the incidents of and surrounding December 17, 1991, including the 
precursors to the accident. The incidents I recall are as follow. 
4. I recall that on or around December 6, 1991, I had a 
dental appointment which I left work for, but which my wife, Dawn, 
had cancelled. Upon learning that the appointment was cancelled, 
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I stayed home because I was not feeling well and because it felt 
nice to have a day off. 
5. While I was home on December 6, I drank at most three 
shots of scotch and ate some pizza, after which I took a nap. 
6. I awoke from the nap and vomited on the bed, which my 
wife cleaned up for me. 
7. I never at any time took any sleeping pills at, or 
immediately prior to, this time; nor do I recall ever purchasing 
any sleeping pills whatsoever on or immediately prior to December 
6th. 
8. On the morning of December 16, 1991, I called my employer 
to find out where the day's job site would be and then left to that 
site. 
9. Upon arriving at the job site, I looked over the job and 
decided what I needed to finish the job, whereupon I noticed that 
I had no extension cord. I returned home to retrieve one. 
10. Prior to this time I had been thinking about separating 
from my wife, Dawn, due to our inability to get along; and at this 
time, on my way home to retrieve the extension cord, I continued to 
think about ending my marriage with Dawn. 
11. Upon arriving at my home, I retrieved the extension cord 
but left it by the front door. At this time I decided that I 
should end the marriage. 
12. I subsequently went around the house to determine which 
items I would take with me, as I was about to leave Dawn. 
13. I asked Dawn to get a pencil and paper so that she would 
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write down a few things that I wished for her to do for me. I had 
her write them so that she would not forget about them. 
14. The notes that Dawn took have already been used as 
evidence in this Court. This note included reminders for Dawn to 
return money to my mother; to tell a friend, Steve, about his 
tools; and to tell another friend, Ed, to keep my screwgun. 
15. After Dawn had finished writing down the things that I 
wanted her to do for me, I told her that I had had enough of the 
mind games and other difficulties that had incessantly accompanied 
our marriage. As I told her this, I believe I did say, "I quit," 
meaning that I was leaving her and planned on dissolving the 
marriage. 
16. I then went out to the car and took everything out of it 
in order to load it again with my things that I wanted to take from 
the house. 
17. I cannot recall if it was at this time or at a later time 
that Dawn asked me, "What about the house?" If it was at this 
time, I then told her she could have it. She asked, "How can I 
have it just like that." I responded by writing on the paper she 
had had earlier that she could have the house and whatever I left 
in it. 
18. I then left to get some gas and fill the air shocks of 
the car in order to be able to later haul my belongings from the 
house. I then realized I had no gas key, so I returned home and 
retrieved the gas key. In the alternative to paragraph 16, this 
may be the time that Dawn asked me, "What about the house?" If 
3
 -30C 660 
this was the time that she did so, then this was also the time that 
I wrote on her paper that she could have the house, etc. 
19. I returned to my car and left again, but instead of 
filling up with gas, I just drove around to vent my anger, calm 
down, and think clearly about whether I actually wanted to end my 
marriage with Dawn. 
20. In Springville, my car began having problems, whereupon 
I drove to a vacant lot, where the car stalled. I tried but failed 
to restart the car. 
21. Instead of calling Dawn to tell her that my car had 
stalled, I called Shelly Conk, my ex-wife. We discussed the 
possibility that the car might be out of gas, and Shelly agreed to 
come and help me. 
22. I then went to a nearby bank to withdraw some money and 
waited for Shelly. 
23. Upon Shelly's arrival, we searched for a gas can, 
checking a couple stores in Springville with no luck. 
24. We eventually found a gas can at a K-Mart in Spanish 
Fork. 
25. We then drove for nostalgic reasons to my old home in 
Spanish Fork where I was raised, and then to another previous home 
in Payson. 
26. Shelly then mentioned that she had been in Wendover the 
week before, and we agreed that it would be fun to go there. We 
stopped at a bank in Payson to get more cash, and then we called my 
sister, Abelina, to see if she would watch our kids. From the 
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conversation as I overheard it, I assumed Abelina consented. 
27. We then returned back to Springville and stopped to fill 
the gas can and Shelly's car. I filled the can and while I started 
to place the nozzle into the car Shelly placed the lid on the 
container and placed it into her car on the floor of the passenger 
side of the back seat. 
28. At this point I could not find the key to my car. Shelly 
and I just laughed and decided to leave my car where it was. 
29. We proceeded to Shelly's mother's house in Orem and 
retrieved our kids, whom we then dropped off at Abelina's house. 
30. We then went to Wendover. On our way to Wendover, I 
found the key to my car, and I placed the key in my sock because 
the key would easily fall out of my pant pockets. 
31. When we arrived in Wendover, we went to a Casino and an 
older man in his sixties or seventies checked our identifications. 
We then played the nickle slots and had mixed drinks. 
32. After a while, Shelly said she was tired due to a party 
she had gone to the night before, so we decided to get a room for 
the night. I assumed that she and Danny Kinder were still going 
together, but she said that such was no longer the case and that we 
could get a room together next door. 
33. Shelly drove us into the hotel's driveway, and I went in 
and checked out the room. 
34. Once inside the hotel room, we watched television, made 
love, and slept. 
35. The following morning, December 17, 1991, I went to 
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shower while Shelly called Abelina. Shelly joined me and we made 
love again. 
36. Upon leaving the shower, we heard the phone ring and 
Shelly said it meant that we had to check out. At this point 
Shelly took a picture of me. 
37. We gathered our things and began going to the Casino next 
door. Shelly needed something from the car so we went to the car 
first. It was at this point that I noticed the damaged windshield 
wiper on Shelly's car, which I removed and placed in the car. 
38. We used our hotel coupons and ate breakfast, then we 
played more slots. We became tired of the Casino, so we left and 
began on our way to Abelinafs house. Shelly asked that I drive 
because she was still a little tired. 
39. Shelly told me to take the Tooele exit heading south 
because it was faster to Abelina's place. I took the exit. 
40. We stopped at a log-cabin type gas station and used the 
restrooms and bought some junk food. 
41. Later, we noticed that we were getting low on gas, so we 
stopped at an old station and got $10.00-worth of gas. Not long 
after this, it began to get dark. 
42. As we continued, we began to talk about my leaving Dawn 
and how Shelly and I might be able to fix things between us. We 
both got excited about the prospects. 
43. When we thought we were getting close to Abelina's house, 
Shelly suggested we stop for a while. We had seen a dirt road 
shortly before, so we turned back and went up the dirt road and 
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turned off the car. 
44. The car kept rolling a little, even though the 
transmission was in gear and the emergency brake was up. So Shelly 
held the brake pedal while I got a rock to put in front of the 
front left tire. 
45. Upon re-entering the car, we continued talking, and 
eventually had sex. This particular time, however, the sex was 
especially passionate and vigorous with myself lying on the fully-
reclined front passenger seat and Shelly on top of me. It is my 
suspicion that it was at this time that the cap to the gas can, 
which was directly below me on the floor of the back seat, became 
dislodged. 
46. After sex, we opened the car door because it was very hot 
and fogged up in the car. Shelly went outside and went to the 
bathroom. When she returned, I lit a cigarette for Shelly, and she 
smoked. 
47. I exited the car and sat on the hood of the car, playing 
with the book of matches I had used to light Shelly's cigarette. 
Shelly came out and cuddled with me for a while, but we soon became 
cold and returned to the car. 
48. Once inside the car, I started the engine and Shelly 
turned on the defroster to clear the windows. As I backed out and 
began to drive over the dirt road, Shelly mentioned that the car 
smelled strongly of gasoline. I agreed and remembered the can of 
gasoline behind and under the still-reclined passenger seat. 
49. As I started to pull out onto the main dirt road, I 
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reached back to check the gas can, but I could not discern whether 
it was still sealed. So I grabbed the container and pulled it out 
from under the front seat and lifted it up and over into the front 
seat area. Shelly shouted, "Oh shit!" and I realized that I had 
been spilling more gas, so I quickly pulled the container over to 
my side of the car. Some gasoline spilled on me, feeling very 
cold, like cold water. 
50. At this point, Shelly took the can and did something with 
it, though I did not see what she did with it. 
51. We both began to notice that the gas was burning our 
skin. Shelly said that we were already near Abelina's house, so we 
should just hurry up and try to get there as fast as we could. 
52. I went very fast through the remaining portion*of dirt 
road. By the time we turned onto the main highway again, I was 
already in fifth gear. 
53. Shelly was complaining about the burning, and it appeared 
that she was trying to wipe the gas off of herself. Shelly then 
appeared to remove her top. I saw a slight flash in the corner of 
my eye. Then I saw a brighter flash, and I saw that Shelly's arms 
were slightly raised and that Shelly was sliding off of the seat. 
A ball of fire rushed up high towards my face. I closed my eyes, 
let go of the steering wheel and went to reach for Shelly. I tried 
to breathe, but I could not get any air. I heard a slight hissing 
noise and my ears popped. I then felt the car tip to the right and 
I jammed my foot somewhere next to the gas pedal. I was thrown 
back to the left side of the car, whereupon I raised my hand up in 
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front of me and held my breath. I felt a few big bounces and then 
I blanked out. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
Trial Court's Jury Instructions Numbered One Through Ten 
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUN1 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOE F. JIRON, 
Defendant. 




Case No 921400242 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the law 
that applies to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow 
the law as the Court states it to you, regardless of what you 
personally believe the law is or ought to be. On the other hand, 
it is your exclusive province to determine the facts in the case, 
and to consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose. 
The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary 
power, but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound 
discretion, and in accordance with rules of law stated to you. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
The fact that the defendant has been charged with a 
crime and has been held to answer thereto is not to be regarded as 
any evidence of his guilt and no inference or presumption adverse 
to him should be drawn because of those facts. 
DO 2 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jl 
In so far as you are concerned, you may consider as 
evidence whatever is admitted in the trial as part of the record, 
whether it be the testimony of witnesses or an article or 
document marked as an exhibit, or other matter admitted, such as 
an admission, agreement, or stipulation. 
At times I have ruled upon^objections to the admission 
or certain things into evidence. Questions relating to 
admissibility of evidence are solely questions of law and you 
must not concern yourself with my reasons for ruling as I have, 
or draw any inferences therefrom in favor of or against either 
party. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the 
court does not determine what weight should be given such 
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. As 
to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not 
conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the 
reason for the objection. 
Statements, arguments, and remarks of counsel are 
intended to help you in understanding the evidence and in 
applying the law, but they are not evidence. You should 
disregard any such utterance that has no basis in the evidence. 
Neither in these instructions nor in any ruling, 
action, or remark that I have made during the course of this 
trial have I intended to interpose any opinion or suggestion as 
to how I would resolve any of the issues of this case. 
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You should construe each instruction in the light of 
and in harmony with the other instructions and you should apply 
the instructions as a whole to the evidence. The order in which 
the instructions are given has no significance and is no 
indication of their relative importance. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J A 
It is your duty to consider the evidence all together, 
fairly, impartially, conscientiously and without prejudice of any 
kind. You should arrive at your verdict solely upon the evidence 
introduced before you upon the trial. You should not consider nor 
be influenced by any evidence offered which was not admitted by 
the court; nor are you to consider any evidence given, if the same 
was afterwards, by the court, ordered stricken out. 
The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, 
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public 
feeling. Both the State of Utah and the defendant have a right to 
demand and they do demand and expect that you will conscientiously 
and dispassionately consider the weight of the evidence and apply 
the law of the case, that you will reach a just verdict regardless 
of what the consequences of such verdict may be. The verdict must 
express the individual opinion of each juror. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. f^ 
A person charged with a crime is presumed to be 
innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be dis-
regarded by the jury at pleasure, but is a substantial, 
essential part of the law and is binding upon the jury. 
This presumption is a humane provision of the law, intended, 
so far as human agency is capable, to guard against the 
danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to 
prevail in the minds of the jury unless and until the jury 
is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 
defendant. And in case of a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J) 
In all criminal cases, the State is required to prove 
each element of the crime charged against a defendant beyond 
a reasonable doubt. This burden of proof is required to be 
based only on the legal evidence presented -in court. You 
must keep in mind in assessing whether the State has met its 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the burden 
never shifts to a defendant to call any witnesses, produce 
any evidence or disprove any element of the crime charged. 
In the context of the above, you are instructed that a 
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense 
growing out of the evidence or lack of evidence in this 
case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require 
proof to an absolute certainty but requires that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it. 
If, after an impartial consideration of all of the 
evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's 
guilt, you must acquit that defendant. If, however, after 
such consideration of the evidence you have no reasonable 
doubt, you should find such defendant guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. b 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah against 
the defendant in which he is accused by the Information of the 
commission of the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I: CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, a First Degree felony, in 
violation of 76-5-201 and 203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that the defendant, on or about December 17, 1991, in 
Utah County, Utah, did intentionally and knowingly cause the death 
of Shelly Jiron. 
COUNT II: ARSON, a itooona Degree felony, in violation of 76-
6-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, 
on or about December 17, 1991, in Utah County, Utah, did unlawfully 
and intentionally damage the property of another by means of fire 
causing damage in excess of $1,000. 
When the defendant was arraigned on this charge he entered a 
plea of not guilty, which casts upon the State the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the 
crime charged, which are set forth in Instruction No5- 7 ~f? . 
The foregoing instruction is not to be regarded as a statement 
of the facts proved in this case, but is to be considered merely 
as a summarized statement of the accusation against the defendant*. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
4rc 
In order for you/find the Defendant guilty of the offense of 
Count I: Criminal Homicide, you must find that each of the 
following essential elements of the crime charged in the 
Information have been established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. On or about December 17, 1991, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. Did intentionally and knowingly, 
5. Cause the death of another. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond 
a reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the 
crime charged, you should find the defendant not guilty. But if 
the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt 
all of the essential elements of the offense as set forth above, 
then you should find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in 
the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. # 
The mental element required as an element of the offense 
charged by the State in this case is that the defendant acted 
knowingly or intentionally. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct for the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result 
of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
In order for yoiy*find the Defendant guilty of the offense of 
Count II: Arson you must find that each of the following essential 
elements of the crime charged in the Information have been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. On or about December 17, 1991, 
3. In Utah County, Utah, 
4. By means of fire or explosives, 
5. Unlawfully, 
6. And intentionally damages, 
7. The property of another, 
8. Where the damage caused exceeded $1,000, but was not more 
than $5,000 in value. 
If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond 
a reasonable doubt any one or more of the essential elements of the 
crime charged, you should find the defendant not guilty. But if 
the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt 
all of the essential elements of the offense as set forth above, 
then you should find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in 
the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /*P 
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